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This dissertation consists of three chapters. The first chapter provides an
overview of the dissertation by summarizing the two papers presented in the follow-
ing chapters.
The paper in the second chapter contributes to the labor-macro literature.
More specifically, I develop a general equilibrium model with labor market search
and matching frictions, endogenous labor force participation and on-the-job search,
which can replicate the labor market dynamics observed in the U.S. data. Most ex-
isting real business cycle models with labor market frictions assume that all agents
in the economy are part of the labor force, therefore these models allow for only
two possible labor market states: employment and unemployment. This is a highly
problematic and unrealistic assumption. Studies that extend the basic model by
incorporating being out of the labor force as a third state, through allowing for
a work-home production (or leisure) decision, find that the model generates coun-
terfactual business cycle statistics: labor force participation is very volatile, while
unemployment is weakly procyclical or acyclical, and has a high positive correlation
with vacancies. The failure of this three-state model to replicate the labor market
dynamics observed in the U.S. data is mainly due to the excessive responsiveness
of labor force participation to labor market conditions determined by aggregate
shocks to productivity. In order to dampen the movements along the labor mar-
ket participation margin in the simple three-state model, I introduce an on-the-job
search mechanism that serves as a second margin along which the household’s la-
bor market adjustments can take place. The proposed model successfully generates
countercyclical unemployment and the Beveridge Curve relationship between unem-
ployment and vacancies. Additionally, the business cycle statistics reproduced by
the modified model are quantitatively more in line with their empirical counterparts.
The third chapter presents a joint study with Mauricio Cárdenas. We analyze
the determinants of the government’s decision to invest in fiscal state capacity,
which refers to the state’s power to raise tax revenue. Using a model we highlight
some political and economic dimensions of this decision, and conclude that political
stability, democracy, income inequality, as well as the valuation of public goods
relative to private goods, are all important variables to consider. We then test the
main predictions of the model using cross-country data and find that fiscal state
capacity is higher in more stable and equal societies, both in economic and political
terms, and in countries where the chances of fighting an external war are high, which
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Chapter 1
An Overview of the Dissertation
This dissertation consists of two papers, whose topics are in two distinct ar-
eas. The first paper contributes to the labor-macro literature by building a general
equilibrium model with labor market frictions, endogenous labor force participation
and on-the-job search that can replicate the labor market dynamics observed in the
U.S. data.
It has now become a standard exercise for macroeconomists to incorporate
labor market search and matching frictions a la Mortensen and Pissarides (1994)
and Pissarides (2000) into the basic real business cycle model. In these models,
the standard Walrasian labor market is replaced with a search-theoretic one, where
both workers and firms need to search in order to be matched and begin production.
An important shortcoming of these models is that all agents in the economy are
assumed to be part of the labor force. One interpretation of this structure is that
the out-of-the-labor-force state is completely ignored; therefore, only the dynamics
of and flows between employment and unemployment can be studied. However,
flows into and out of the labor force are quantitatively as big as flows between
employment and unemployment in the U.S. labor market. Another interpretation is
that unemployment and out of the labor force are lumped into a single state. This is
also problematic, since these two labor market states do not have the same business
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cycle properties.
Existing studies that extend the basic model by incorporating an out-of-the-
labor-force state, through allowing for a work-home production (or leisure) deci-
sion, find that the model generates counterfactual business cycle statistics. More
specifically, the model generates highly volatile labor force participation, weakly
procyclical or acyclical unemployment, and a high positive correlation between un-
employment and vacancies. The failure of the extended basic model to replicate
the labor market dynamics observed in the U.S. data is mainly due to the excessive
responsiveness of labor force participation to labor market conditions determined by
aggregate shocks to productivity. In order to bring the three-state model closer to
the data, there is need for a mechanism that dampens the movements along the par-
ticipation margin and breaks the close relationship between labor force participation
and employment.
It is a well-established fact that job-to-job transitions are a crucial part of U.S.
labor market dynamics. These flows are as big as flows between out of the labor force
and employment, while they are twice as big as flows between unemployment and
employment. Using this empirical evidence, I introduce an on-the-job search mech-
anism to the basic three-state model that serves as a second margin along which the
household’s labor market adjustments can take place. The modified model success-
fully generates countercyclical unemployment and the Beveridge Curve relationship
between unemployment and vacancies. Quantitatively, the business cycle statistics
reproduced by the modified model are more in line with the U.S. data.
The second paper, which I co-author with Mauricio Cárdenas, explores a topic
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in the field of political economics. We analyze the determinants of the government’s
decision to invest in state capacity, where state capacity is defined as the state’s
ability to tax its people.
We use a two-period, two-group political economy model based on the theo-
retical framework developed in Besley and Persson (2009). We name the two groups
as elites and citizens, and assume that the elites constitute the minority group. In
each period the group holding political power maximizes the weighted sum of the
utilities of the groups and determines the group-specific tax rates, spending in pub-
lic goods and the level of investment in state capacity. The maximum tax rate is
determined by the capacity of the state. State capacity does not depreciate, but
it can be increased with costly investments by the government. We assume that
the system is politically unequal when the utility of a particular group is weighted
disproportionately. We also allow for political instability, and assume that the po-
litical system is unstable if the ruling group is likely to lose political power to the
opponent group, which can occur, for example, as a result of a civil war. Finally,
we allow for income inequality between the two groups.
Using this theoretical framework we show that the effects of external and civil
(internal) wars go in the opposite directions. While the future risk of fighting ex-
ternal wars leads to higher investment in state capacity, fighting civil wars (which
is a measure of political instability) causes the government to invest less in state
capacity. In the case of political inequality, our model predicts that more demo-
cratic political systems (lower political inequality) invest more in state capacity. If
there is no income inequality, then these results are independent of which group
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holds political power. However, if there is income inequality the investment decision
becomes group-specific. That is, when the elites are in power and there is political
instability, both income and political inequality lead to lower investment in state
capacity. Conversely, if the citizens are the rulers, we find that the combination of
high political and income inequality results in higher state capacity. However, this
is not always true; in some cases, inequality can lead to lower investment in state
capacity, rationalizing the failed social revolutions.
We then test the main predictions of the model using cross-country data and
several different measures of state capacity, which cover different and complementary
aspects, ranging from fiscal to bureaucratic dimensions. We find empirical evidence
that state capacity is higher in more stable and equal societies, both in economic and
political terms, and in countries where the chances of fighting an external war are
high, which is a proxy for the value of public goods. Lastly, when the interactions of
income inequality with political stability and democracy are considered, our results
indicate that, in the presence of income inequality, the magnitudes of the positive




Labor Market Dynamics with Endogenous Labor Force Participation
2.1 Introduction
Previous studies that incorporate endogenous labor force participation in a
simple business cycle framework with labor market frictions find that this three-
state model fails to replicate the labor market dynamics observed in the U.S. data.
More specifically, the model is unable to generate strongly countercyclical unem-
ployment and the negative correlation between unemployment and vacancies, also
known as the Beveridge Curve relationship. In this chapter I develop an alternative
general equilibrium business cycle model that also features labor market frictions
and endogenous labor force participation. Based on the empirical evidence that
job-to-job flows are high in the U.S. labor market, I introduce an on-the-job search
mechanism, which serves as an additional margin along which the labor market ad-
justments can take place. I show that the proposed model with on-the-job search
generates labor market dynamics that are significantly different from those pre-
sented in the previous studies. More specifically, the model successfully generates
countercyclical unemployment and the Beveridge Curve relationship observed in the
data.
Incorporating labor market search and matching frictions a la Mortensen and
Pissarides (1994) and Pissarides (2000) into the basic real business cycle model
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has become a common exercise for macroeconomists. Merz (1995, 1999), Andol-
fatto (1996), Den Haan, Ramey and Watson (2000) and others replace the standard
Walrasian labor market with a search-theoretic one, where both workers and firms
need to search in order to be matched and begin production. This two-sided search
mechanism has been shown to improve the quantitative properties of the basic real
business cycle model.
The aforementioned studies assume that all agents in the economy are in the
labor force (or, equivalently, that the labor force participation decision is exogenous).
In these models there are only two possible labor market states: unemployment and
employment. One interpretation of this structure is that the out-of-the-labor-force
state is completely ignored. In this environment only the dynamics of and flows be-
tween employment and unemployment can be studied. However, empirical evidence
shows that flows into and out of the labor force are quantitatively as important as
flows between employment and unemployment in the U.S. labor market. It is also
important to consider the participation margin in models focusing on other aspects
of labor markets, for example the effects of policies, such as unemployment benefits
and minimum wages on labor market outcomes and dynamics. Another interpre-
tation of the two-state model is that unemployment and out of the labor force are
lumped into a single state. This is problematic as well, since these two states do
not have the same business cycle properties. Unemployment is highly countercycli-
cal, whereas participation is weakly procyclical. Unemployment is seven times more
volatile than output, while the volatility of participation is much lower than that of
output.
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In an attempt to address the above criticisms, several studies have included
being out of the labor force as a third state. Shi and Wen (1999) develop a three-
state model in order to examine the dynamic effects of taxes and subsidies. Tripier
(2003) considers a real business cycle version of the Mortensen and Pissarides search
and matching model with three states in order to investigate the business cycle
properties of the major labor market variables. His results indicate that the model
can match the behavior of employment, but, it cannot match the empirical properties
of unemployment and labor force participation. When the economy is subject to
only aggregate technology shocks, the model fails to generate the observed strong
countercyclicality of unemployment and the observed strong negative relationship
between vacancies and unemployment.
More recently, Veracierto (2008) extends the Lucas and Prescott (1974) is-
lands model by adding an out-of-the-labor-force state, as well as endogenous job
acceptance and job separation decisions. As in Tripier (2003), Veracierto (2008)
investigates the dynamic properties of the labor market variables, and concludes
that the model fails in many directions when the third state is introduced. The
volatility of unemployment turns out to be very low and unemployment becomes
weakly procyclical, while labor force participation becomes strongly procyclical and
turns out to be as volatile as employment.1
The main reasons why these three-state models fail to match the data are
1There are other important studies that consider the three-state model, such as Pries and Roger-
son (2008) and Krusell et al. (2009). However, they consider heterogenous worker environments
and study mainly the flows into and out of the labor force.
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that labor force participation follows employment too closely and search decisions
respond too much to aggregate productivity shocks. When the economy is hit by
a positive productivity shock, labor force participation increases and more workers
begin to search for jobs, since it is a bad time to be out of the labor force, whether
engaging in home production or enjoying leisure. In turn, labor force participation
becomes strongly procyclical. Since forming matches takes time, not all agents
searching for jobs get placed at jobs initially. Unemployment increases sharply at
first and follows an acyclical (or a weakly procyclical) pattern overall. As firms open
more vacancies employment increases and unemployment decreases. The decrease
in unemployment results in lower incentive for firms to open vacancies, and vacancy
creation decreases as well. Since both vacancies and unemployment increase on
impact with the positive and persistent technology shock, and then fall quickly to
levels around their steady states, the model cannot generate the downward-sloping
Beveridge curve.
The above mechanism suggests that, in order to bring the three-state model
closer to the data, we need a mechanism that dampens the movements along the par-
ticipation margin and breaks the close relationship between labor force participation
and employment.
Empirical evidence shows that job-to-job transitions are a crucial part of U.S.
labor market dynamics. These flows are as big as flows between out of the labor
force and employment, and they are twice as big as flows between unemployment
and employment. In light of this evidence, I enrich the basic three-state model
with an on-the-job search mechanism. The intuition for why on-the-job search
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affects the performance of the three-state model is as follows. In the simpler model
without on-the-job search, adjustments to aggregate economic conditions mainly
take place at the participation margin. In response to a positive productivity shock,
the representative household increases labor market participation by assigning more
members to search for jobs. However, when an on-the-job search mechanism is
introduced, there is a second margin along which the household’s labor market
adjustments can take place. In addition to the unemployed searchers, the employed
household members can also be assigned to search for better jobs. As long as job
finding and wage rates remain high, the overall utility of the household can be
increased without big adjustments at the participation margin.
The model I propose is an extension of the real business cycle model with labor
market search and matching frictions as in Merz (1995, 1999) and Andolfatto (1996).
It differs from these models by allowing agents to be out of the labor force, as well
as being employed, or being unemployed and searching for a job. In introducing
endogenous labor force participation I follow the model in Tripier (2003). There
is also on-the-job search, which gives the employed agents the ability to switch
to better-paying jobs. In a recent study Krause and Lubik (2010) develop a two-
state search and matching model with on-the-job search in order to address the
Shimer (2005) puzzle. I follow their approach in introducing the on-the-job search
mechanism.
The results can be summarized as follows. With the introduction of the on-
the-job search mechanism, the three-state model performs better in matching the
dynamic properties of the major labor market variables. The business cycle statis-
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tics calculated from the series produced by simulating the model are more in line
with their empirical counterparts. Most importantly, the model can generate coun-
tercyclical unemployment and the negative correlation between unemployment and
vacancies observed in the data.
The organization of this chapter is as follows: A brief literature review is
presented in Section 2.2. Section 2.3 provides some empirical facts on U.S. labor
market flows. I present the theoretical model in Section 2.4. Section 2.5 explains
the calibration strategy and displays the impulse responses. Section 2.6 presents
the U.S. business cycle statistics. I discuss the main results in Section 2.7. Finally,
Section 2.8 concludes.
2.2 Related Literature
This study is related to three strands of literature. First, it builds on the
existing studies that integrate the canonical two-state Mortensen and Pissarides
search and matching model into a real business cycle environment, such as Merz
(1995, 1999), Andolfatto (1996), Den Haan, Ramey and Watson (2000).
Second, it is related to papers that consider a three-state labor market struc-
ture. As discussed earlier, the leading studies in this group, Tripier (2003) and
Veracierto (2008), both conclude that when an out-of-the-labor-force state is added
to the basic two-state model, the model generates counterfactual results, which is
puzzling, since the two-state model is reasonably successful in generating the ob-
served labor market dynamics. This study attempts to solve this puzzle by proposing
10
an alternative three-state model with on-the-job search, which allows for job-to-job
flows. Another paper which studies this puzzle is Ebell (2010). Different from my
approach, she relies solely on alternative parametrization to improve the results of
the three-state model.2
Finally, this study is related to the literature that studies on-the-job search
and job-to-job transitions observed in the U.S. labor market. In an early study,
Burdett (1978) constructs a model where both the employed and the unemployed
workers engage in search activity. He shows that workers move to better-paying
jobs when possible with the help of on-the-job search, and that the probability of a
separation from a job is negatively related to its wage rate. He uses this framework
to explain the wage-tenure relationship observed in the data. Pissarides (1994)
and Burdett and Mortensen (1998) integrate a similar on-the-job search mechanism
in a general equilibrium setting. The former study argues that on-the-job search
influences the composition of jobs, which leads firms to open relatively more jobs
for the employed job seekers. He suggests that this mechanism can amplify the
response of vacancies, while muting that of unemployment in response to changes
in aggregate economic conditions. The latter study uses a version of the basic job-
ladder model to explain wage differentials across ex-ante identical workers. In a
more recent study, Nagypal (2005) shows that a basic job-ladder model is unable
to account quantitatively for the features of observed job-to-job transitions. She
proposes an alternative theoretical framework, where job-switching is used as a way
to escape from unemployment. Nagypal (2004) and Krause and Lubik (2010) both
2See Subsection 2.7.3 for further details on her study.
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address the Shimer (2005) puzzle using on-the-job search. The former study shows
that the preference of firms to hire the employed workers can help explain the large
fluctuations in the vacancy-unemployment ratio, which cannot be generated by the
two-state search and matching model. The latter paper takes a similar approach,
but integrates on-the-job search in a real business cycle model with labor market
frictions. It also finds that adding an on-the-job search mechanism helps to increase
the volatility of vacancies and unemployment, and enhances the overall amplification
and propagation properties of the basic two-state model.
The theoretical framework presented in Section 2.4 follows closely Krause and
Lubik (2010) in developing a two-sector economy where the workers are allowed to
flow between jobs. The main difference is that, while Krause and Lubik (2010) build
on a two-state labor market framework, I also consider an out-of-the-labor-state and
endogenize the labor market participation decision.
2.3 Flows in the U.S. Labor Market
In this section I present the basic facts on job-to-job transitions and movements
in and out of the labor force in the U.S. labor market, which motivate the theoretical
framework to be introduced in the next section.
Empirical evidence shows that flows in the U.S. labor market are large. Pre-
vious studies have mainly focused on flows of workers between employment, unem-
ployment and out-of-the-labor-force states. However, the efforts to measure job-
to-job flows have been limited. Fallick and Fleischman (2004) is the first study
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that provides reliable empirical measures of employer-to-employer flows (employer-
to-employer flows correspond to job-to-job flows in this study; therefore, I use the
two terms interchangeably). In order to construct their dataset, they utilize the
dependent interviewing method used in the monthly Current Population Survey
(CPS). Since 1994, the CPS has asked the respondents who continue to be em-
ployed in consecutive months whether they have stayed with the same employer
or not. Using the responses to this question, Fallick and Fleischman construct a
series for aggregate monthly employer-to-employer flows, in addition to aggregate
flows between employment, unemployment and out-of-the-labor-force states. Their
updated dataset provides information on all labor market flows for 1994-2009 and
it is publicly available. I use this CPS-based dataset to construct Table 2.1, which
summarizes U.S. labor market flows.3
Table 2.1: Flows in the U.S. Labor Market: 1994-2005 Monthly Data
State in the 2nd Period
Percentage of Population
State in the 1st Period Same Employer New Employer Unemployed Out of the Labor Force
Employed 58.81 1.61 0.81 1.70
Unemployed - 0.97 1.69 0.81
Out of the Labor Force - 1.58 0.81 31.20
Percentage of State in the 1st Period
State in the 1st Period Same Employer New Employer Unemployed Out of the Labor Force
Employed 93.45 2.56 1.29 2.70
Unemployed - 27.95 48.70 23.34
Out of the Labor Force - 4.70 2.41 92.88
3I use data through 2005 in calculating the U.S. business cycle statistics later in the chapter;
therefore, flows presented here are calculated through 2005 as well.
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The survey results indicate that on average, 2.56 percent of the employed
workers change employers each month. These flows constitute almost 40 percent
of all separations from employment, are twice as big as flows from employment to
unemployment and are comparable to flows from employment to out of the labor
force. The number of individuals changing employers is almost equal to the number
of unemployed staying unemployed (1.69 percent of the total population) and is more
than the number of unemployed finding jobs (0.97 percent of the total population)
or dropping out of the labor force (0.81 percent of the total population).
Table 2.1 also shows that flows into and out of the labor force are as large or
larger on average as flows between employment and unemployment. More specifi-
cally, while 2.70 percent of the employed leave the labor force each month, only 1.29
percent of the employed become unemployed. Similarly, flows from unemployment
to out of the labor force (23.34 percent of the unemployed) are almost as big as
flows from unemployment into employment (27.95 percent of the unemployed). As
for flows into the labor force, each month 2.39 percent of the total population move
into the labor force, of which 66 percent become employed and the rest become
unemployed.
As documented in Fallick and Fleischman (2004), employer-to-employer flows
are procyclical. Procyclicality also holds when the quit series in the Job Openings
and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS) is used as an alternative measure. On the
contrary, the number of workers out of the labor force is only slightly countercyclical,
compared to the strong countercyclicality of unemployment.
In light of the empirical evidence presented in this section, I conclude that it
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is highly misleading to assume only two states (employment and unemployment) in
a model focusing on labor market dynamics. Employer-to-employer flows, as well
as flows into and out of the labor force, are quantitatively as important as flows
between employment and unemployment. Therefore, I enrich the simple search
and matching model by including an out-of-the-labor-force state and allowing for
job-to-job transitions. The next section introduces the proposed theoretical model.
2.4 The Model
I study a real business cycle model with labor market frictions which has two
non-standard features: on-the-job search, which leads to job-to-job transitions, and
endogenous labor force participation. The economy consists of a continuum of mea-
sure one of identical households, and heterogenous firms owned by the households.
I follow Acemoglu (2001) and Krause and Lubik (2010) in introducing two types of
firms, which open vacancies for high-wage (good) and low-wage (bad) jobs for the
workers. Vacancy creation is costly, and I assume that the vacancy creation cost
is higher for a high-wage firm than for a low-wage firm. Heterogeneity in wages
between high-wage and low-wage jobs provides the motive for on-the-job search.
The heterogenous firms produce two types of intermediate goods. These goods are
then used by the final goods sector to produce the single consumption good in the
economy. The details of the model are explained in the following subsections.
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2.4.1 The Representative Household and the Labor Markets
The representative household consists of a continuum of homogenous house-
hold members with a total measure of one. A household member can be employed,
unemployed and searching for a job, or out of the labor force. The household mem-
bers who are not participating in the labor force engage in home production, which
increases the utility of the whole household. The resources of the household are
pooled by its members, and there is complete risk-sharing within the household. In
each period, the household decides how many of its members will work, how many
will search for a job, and how many will stay out of the labor force. The employed
household members work at two possible types of jobs: high-wage (good) jobs and
low-wage (bad) jobs. A measure ngt of household members work at a high-wage job,
where the wage rate is wgt in period t. A measure n
b
t of household members work
at a low-wage job at the wage rate of wbt . From workers’ point of view, the two
jobs differ only in the wages that they pay. All members working at low-wage jobs
search for high-wage jobs with an endogenous search intensity, st, which is subject
to a time cost of κ(st).
4 A measure ugt of the unemployed household members search
for high-wage jobs, while measure ubt search for low-wage jobs in period t. That is,
job search is directed. All unemployed members search with intensity one and there
is no direct utility cost associated with their search.
Given the above specification, the degree of search activity by the unemployed
is equal to ugt + u
b
t . Each unemployed member of the representative household re-
4This is a real world interpretation of the on-the-job search in the model. Literally, the search
activity results in less members engaging in home production, which will become clearer later.
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ceives a fixed unemployment benefit of d. These benefits are financed by the govern-
ment via collecting a lump-sum tax from the household. The household members
who are out of the labor force provide lt = 1− ugt − ubt − n
g
t − [1 + κ(st)]nbt units of
home production. While I do not model the intensive margin of hours per worker,
the interpretation of this equation is similar to a time allocation story. The house-
hold allocates some members to work, some to search for jobs, and the rest con-
tributes to home production. With the on-the-job search cost added, the time cost
of a household member working at a low-wage job becomes [1 + κ(st)], resulting in
less household members engaging in home production. This can be interpreted as
on-the-job searchers spending time to look for jobs in addition to their work hours.5
The consumption good of the household is purchased from the final goods
sector and its price is normalized to unity. The household owns a capital stock of kt
at the beginning of period t, rents its capital to firms at the competitive rental rate
of rt, and decides the level of capital investment it. The capital stock depreciates
at rate δ. The household also owns the firms and receives profits of πt in the
form of lump-sum payments. Finally, the transfer between the household and the
government is in the form of lump-sum taxation T .
The frictional matchings between workers and firms are represented by the
matching functions for each type of job. High-wage firms open vgt measure of va-
cancies for high-wage jobs in period t. Unemployed workers who are looking for
high-wage jobs are matched with these vacancies with an endogenous probability
5In an alternative version, I model the cost of on-the-job search as a pecuniary cost in the
household’s budget constraint. The results are not affected by this change.
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equal to pgt . This probability is equal to stp
g
t for job-switchers. All matches (includ-
ing the newly formed matches) are destroyed with an exogenous probability of ψ at
the end of each period, while all surviving matches become productive in the next
period. The matching function, evolution of employment, workers’ job finding prob-
ability, firms’ vacancy filling probability and labor market tightness in the market









































Similarly, low-wage firms open vbt measure of vacancies for low-wage jobs in
period t. Unemployed workers who are looking for low-wage jobs get matched with
these vacancies with an endogenous probability equal to pbt . Moreover, some work-
ing at low-wage jobs get exogenously separated or move to high-wage jobs at the
end of each period. The matching function, evolution of employment, workers’ job
finding probability, firms’ vacancy filling probability and labor market tightness in
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subject to the budget constraint, the laws of motion for capital and employment,











t) + πt = ct + it + Tt (2.12)
it = kt+1 − (1− δ)kt (2.13)











nbt+1 = (1− ψ)
[
(1− pgt st)nbt + pbtubt
]
(2.15)
lt = 1− ugt − ubt − n
g
t − [1 + κ(st)]nbt (2.16)
where u(ct) is the utility derived from the consumption of goods and h(lt) is the
utility derived from home production. I assume that 0 < β < 1, uc(ct) > 0, and
hl(lt) > 0. In this section, I discuss only the optimality conditions derived by solving
the household’s problem. All first order conditions (FOCs) and derivations are
presented in Appendix A.1.
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Combining the FOCs with respect to ct and it yields the standard Euler equa-
tion for consumption:
uc(ct) = βEt{uc(ct+1)(rt+1 + 1− δ)} (2.17)
where uc(ct) is the derivative of the household’s utility function with respect to






The FOC with respect to ugt yields the following optimality condition, which












Once the household allocates a member to look for a high-wage job, she joins
the pool of the unemployed in the market for good jobs. In this state, the household
has one less member engaging in home production, but one more member receiving
unemployment benefits. The left hand side of the above equation represents this
marginal cost of searching for a good job, which is the disutility due to reduced
home production net of the unemployment benefits received by the searcher. Note
that this cost is scaled by the endogenous job finding rate, since with probability
pgt the unemployed worker gets matched with a high-wage job. The right hand side
stands for the household’s expected marginal benefit from having one more member
with a high-wage job in the next period. Since production takes place one period
after the matches take place, the wage income and the marginal disutility of work
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are inside the expectations sign. The last term on the right hand side is the asset
value of having one less household member search for a job in the next period.
In order to write down all expressions in terms of goods, the wage rate and the
unemployment benefits are multiplied by uc(ct), which is the value of the Lagrange
multiplier associated with the budget constraint of the household.
Similarly, the FOC with respect to ubt yields the optimality condition that






















Again, the left hand side of this equation shows the household’s marginal cost
of having a member search in the market for low-wage jobs. The right hand side
stands for the household’s expected marginal benefit of having a member work at
a low-wage job next period. The first part on the right hand side is the marginal
gain from having a member work at a low-wage job, which is the wage income net
of cost for search effort and disutility of work. I assume that all household members
working at low-wage jobs search with the same endogenous search intensity, so they
all suffer from the search cost. The last two terms on the right hand side represent
the asset value of the employed worker participating in the market for low-wage
jobs. With probability pgt+1st+1 the worker will switch to a high-wage job, otherwise
she will stay in the current low-wage job. As long as the worker is not separated
exogenously, she will continue to work at one of the two types of jobs. Again, the
21
terms representing the marginal cost of participation are scaled by the endogenous
job finding rate, and all monetary terms are expressed in terms of goods.






























Equation (2.21) determines the optimal level of search intensity for the workers
who are currently employed at low-wage jobs. I assume κ(st) to be increasing and
convex in st. Then, Equation (2.21) states that the search intensity increases with
the difference between the asset values of high-wage and low-wage jobs. Also note
that, as long as the probability of finding a high-wage job is less than that of a
low-wage job (pgt < p
b
t), and as long as being unemployed carries a net utility cost
(hl(lt) > uc(ct)d), it is always optimal for the household to choose a positive search
intensity for on-the-job search.
2.4.2 The Firms
There are two types of firms, which offer high-wage and low-wage jobs. All
firms use the same constant returns to scale production function and are subject to
an aggregate technology shock zt. Labor and capital are the inputs of production. I
assume that the two firms differ in the cost they face when opening new vacancies.
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The vacancy creation cost for high-wage firms is assumed to be higher than that
for low-wage firms, that is γg > γb. The two outputs are imperfect substitutes in
final goods production. The production functions of the heterogenous intermediate
goods and the final goods firms are given as:
Y gt = e
zt(N gt )
α(Kgt )









The price of the final consumption good is normalized to unity. The prices of
the goods produced by the intermediate goods firms are Prgt and Pr
b
t , which can be
further expressed as:












Firms’ vacancy filling rates depend on the matching functions for each type of








The optimization problem of a high-wage firm is to choose vgt and K
g
t , taking
{wgt , qgt , P rgt , rt, zt} as given, to maximize:
V fgt (N
g










subject to the law of motion for employment in the market for high-wage jobs:








where Ξt+1|t is the stochastic discount factor defined earlier. All FOCs and deriva-
tions are presented in Appendix A.2.
The market for capital is competitive; therefore, the rental price of capital is
equal to the marginal product of capital:




Using the FOC with respect to vacancies, I derive the job creation equation
















The left hand size of this job creation equation represents the firm’s average
cost of opening a high-wage vacancy and searching for a worker. The vacancy
creation cost is divided by qgt , the endogenous probability of filling the vacancy. The
right hand side represents the discounted expected benefit of hiring a worker. The
first term is the expected marginal benefit of having a worker engaged in the job,
the second one is the expected wage rate paid to the worker, and the last term is
the asset value of having the vacancy filled in the next period. All terms on the
right hand side are multiplied with (1− ψ) to account for the exogenous separation
probability.









t , st, P r
b
t , rt, zt
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as given, to maximize the the value function:
V fbt (N
b













subject to the law of motion for employment in the market for low-wage jobs:
N bt+1 = (1− ψ)
[
(1− pgt st)N bt + qbtvbt
]
(2.32)
See Appendix A.2 for all FOCs and derivations presented here. Again, the
rental price of capital is equal to the marginal product of capital:






















The interpretation of this job creation equation is similar to the interpretation
of Equation (2.30). The only difference is that now the firm takes into account the
probability that the worker currently engaged in a low-wage job may switch to a
high-wage job. The left hand side shows the average cost of opening a vacancy in
the current period. Since the worker becomes productive in the next period, the
gains from hiring the worker are expressed in expectations. The first two terms
represent the expected gain of hiring the worker net of wages paid. The last term
is the expected gain of keeping the vacancy occupied in the next period, accounting
for the probability that the worker can leave for a high-wage job. All terms on the




The wage rates in the markets for high-wage and low-wage jobs are determined
through Nash bargaining between matched worker and firm pairs. I let µ and (1− µ)
represent the bargaining weights for the worker and the firm, respectively. The Nash




















t , kt+1) is the marginal value
for the household of having a member working at a type i job, and V fiN i(N
i
t , zt) is
the marginal value for the firm of hiring a worker for a type i job.
Solving the above Nash bargaining problem for each type of job gives the
corresponding wage rates. The derivations are presented in Appendix A.3. The





























For high-wage jobs, the wage rate is the weighted sum of the threshold values
for the worker and the firm. On the one hand, the firm’s marginal benefit from hiring
a worker for a high-wage job is αPrgt
Y tg
Ngt
, which is thus the firm’s threshold level.
The firm would not agree to pay a wage rate higher than this amount. On the other
hand, the threshold level for the worker to accept a good job is the disutility from
giving up home production hl(lt)
uc(ct)
, expressed in terms of goods. The worker would
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not agree to work for a wage rate below this value. Note that the weights that
multiply the threshold levels correspond to the bargaining weights for the worker
and the firm.
Similarly, the wage rate for a low-wage job is the weighted sum of the threshold
values for working and hiring. When the worker and the firm are engaged in a low-
wage job relationship, they both incur some additional costs. By assumption, the
worker searches for a high-wage job; therefore, she pays for the cost of her search
activity. On the other hand, the firm faces the risk of having an unfilled vacancy due
to the possibility of the worker leaving to work at a high-wage job. Therefore, the
threshold values are adjusted to compensate for the costs of a possible endogenous
termination of the employment relationship.
2.4.4 Closing the Model and the Competitive Equilibrium
There is no government consumption. The government collects taxes to finance
the unemployment benefits. The aggregate resource constraint for the economy
reads as:
Yt = ct + γ
gvgt + γ
bvbt + it (2.38)






with εz ∼ (0, σ2z) and 0 < ρz < 1.
I close this subsection by defining a competitive equilibrium of the model.
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Definition 2.1. A competitive equilibrium of the model is defined as the deci-
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and the stochastic technology shock {zt}, such that:












3. Household choices satisfy Equations (2.17)-(2.22);
4. Firms’ choices satisfy Equations (2.30) and (2.34);
5. The law of motion for capital, Equation (2.13), and the laws of motion for
employment, Equations (2.14) and (2.15), or (2.28) and (2.32) are satisfied;
6. Definitions of the matching functions, Equations (2.1) and (2.6), of the job
finding and vacancy filling probabilities, Equations (2.3), (2.4), (2.8) and (2.9), and
of labor market tightness, Equations (2.5) and (2.10) are satisfied;
7. Wage rates and the rental rate of capital satisfy Equations (2.36), (2.37),
(2.29) and (2.33);
8. The aggregate resource constraint, Equation (2.38), is satisfied.
2.4.5 The Workers’ Indifference Condition
Since both jobs coexist in the equilibrium, it must be the case that an un-
employed household member is indifferent between looking for a high-wage and a
low-wage job. In other words, the asset values of both types of unemployment have
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to be equal. This leads to the following equilibrium result.
Proposition 2.1. In the equilibrium, the relative labor market tightness for the







Since we assume that γg > γb, labor market tightness must be higher in the market
for low-wage jobs in the equilibrium.























2.5 Calibration and Impulse Responses
In this section I present the calibration of the main parameters of the model.
I calibrate the proposed model to the U.S. data for the period 1951-2005. First, I
choose the parameters that can be set without solving the model. Next, I choose the
remaining parameters so that the model matches relevant first-order and second-
order moments calculated from the data. Based on the calibration, I conduct a
variety of numerical analyses. I present the implied impulse response functions in
this section, leaving the business cycle statistics to the next section. In all analyses
I compare the proposed model’s results with the simpler three-state model without
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on-the-job search.
The period length is one quarter. Household preferences are taken as:




where H̄ is a constant and φ is an elasticity parameter. The matching functions for













I use κ(st) = Bs
σ
t as the functional form for the search cost, where B is a
positive constant and σ > 1, so that the cost of on-the-job search is strictly increasing
and convex in the search intensity st.
2.5.1 Parameters Taken from Various Sources
The household discount factor β is 0.99, which corresponds to a 4 percent
annual interest rate. Veracierto (2008) calculates the steady state level of monthly
investment-to-capital ratio as 0.006. This implies a quarterly capital depreciation
rate of 0.018; therefore, δ = 0.018. Following earlier studies in the real business cycle
literature, the elasticity of output with respect to capital in the intermediate goods
production function (1− α) is 0.36, and the persistence parameter in the AR(1)
process of the logarithm of the aggregate technology shock is 0.95.
The elasticity parameter ε in the matching functions is 0.40, which is the
estimated value in Blanchard and Diamond (1989). In order to satisfy the Hosios
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(1990) condition, the bargaining power of workers in the Nash bargaining problem
µ is also set equal to 0.40.
Next, I calculate the exogenous and endogenous separation rates in the data.
In the model, total separations consist of both exogenous and endogenous sepa-
rations. Using the dataset compiled by Fallick and Fleischman (2004), I showed
earlier that employer-to-employer flows correspond to almost 40 percent of total
separations from employment. Davis, Faberman, Haltiwanger and Rucker (2008)
examine the JOLTS data, adjust the worker flow rates and report a monthly total
separation rate of 4.96. This corresponds to a quarterly total separation rate of 14.9.
Using this information, I set exogenous and endogenous separation rates as 0.095
and 0.059, respectively. All parameter values chosen a priori are reported in Table
2.2.
Table 2.2: Parameters Chosen Without Solving the Model
Value Description Source
β 0.99 Household Discount Factor Annual Interest Rate = 0.04
δ 0.018 Depreciation Rate Veracierto (2008)
α 0.64 Elasticity of Output wrt. Labor RBC Literature
ρz 0.95 Persistence of the Agg. Tech. Shock RBC Literature
ε 0.4 Match Elasticity Blanchard and Diamond (1989)
µ 0.4 Nash Bargaining Share Hosios (1990)
ψ 0.095 Exogenous Separation Rate Based on JOLTS and CPS Data
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2.5.2 Parameters Set to Match Certain Targets
The remaining parameters are set so that the model solution matches certain
data moments. These parameters are reported in Table 2.3. The elasticity of home
production in the household preferences φ is 0.22, which is calibrated to match
the volatility of employment relative to output in the data, as in Tripier (2003)
and Veracierto (2008).6 The preference constant H̄ is calibrated to generate an
employment to population ratio of 0.59, which is the average quarterly ratio in the
U.S. labor market for the period 1951-2005. The resulting value is 1.05.
In order to set the elasticity parameter in the search cost function σ, I choose
the volatility of employer-to-employer flows relative to output as my target. I use
the data set provided by Fallick and Fleischman (2004) and calculate the volatility
of employer-to-employer flows relative to output as 12.25 for 1994-2005 at quarterly
frequency.7 Using this target, the calibrated value for the elasticity parameter in the
6Both Tripier (2003) and Veracierto (2008) calibrate of the preference parameter in the house-
hold’s utility function in the same way. Veracierto (2008) uses three different utility functions,
one linear as in Merz (1997), and two non-linear as in Shi and Wen (1999) and Hornstein and
Yuan (1998), to evaluate the performance of the basic three-state model. In all three calibrations,
he determines the curvature of home production in the utility function by targeting the relative
standard deviation of employment calculated from the U.S. data. Veracierto (2008) uses the same
utility function specified earlier in this chapter and repeats Tripier’s calibration strategy.
7The series are logged and HP-filtered (smoothing paramater is 105). This is of course an
imperfect way to measure the volatility of job-to-job flows, however no employer-to-employer data
exists before 1994. Krause and Lubik (2010) use quits from the BLS labor turnover series for the
manufacturing sector for 1950-1981 and calculate the relative volatility of quits as 10.06.
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Table 2.3: Parameters Chosen by Solving the Model
Parameter Value Description
φ 0.22 Elasticity of Home Production
H̄ 1.05 Constant in the HH Pref. for Home Production
σ 1.2 Elasticity of Search Cost
B 0.09 Constant in the Search Cost Function
m̄ 0.75 Matching Function Constant
γg 0.6 High-Wage Vacancy Creation Cost
γb 0.2 Low-Wage Vacancy Creation Cost
% 0.4 Low-Wage Firms’ Weight in Production
d 0.6 Unemployment Benefit
εz 0.0074 Std. of Log of Agg. Tech. Shock
Targets
Relative Volatility of Employment
Employment/Population = 0.59
Relative Volatility of E-E Flows
Endogenous Separation Rate = 0.059
Average Firm Matching Probability = 0.78
Ratio of Vacancy Creation Costs = 3
Total Vacancy Cost/Output = 0.05
Employment Share of Low-Wage Firms = 0.4
Benefit to Wage Ratio = 0.7
Volatility of Output
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search cost function turns out to be 1.2. The constant in the search cost function
B is calibrated to match a steady state endogenous separation rate of 0.059, as was
calculated above. The resulting value is 0.09.
Since the matching technologies are the same in the two sectors, the constants
in the matching functions are the same as well. Targeting an average quarterly
vacancy filling probability of 0.78, the constant becomes 0.75.8 Vacancy creation
costs γb and γg are calibrated to generate a total vacancy creation cost of 5 percent
of total output as in Krause and Lubik (2010).9 The vacancy creation cost for high-
wage firms is assumed to be three times the cost for low-wage firms. Using these
two targets, γb and γg turn out to be 0.2 and 0.6, respectively.
A brief explanation on the ratio of the vacancy creation costs is in order. Davis,
Faberman and Haltiwanger (2010) report that not all firms post vacancies in order
to attract workers. More specifically, they find that 67.2 percent of hiring occurs
without vacancy posting at establishments in the construction sector. In terms of
employment, 73.7 percent of employment in the construction sector is at establish-
ments that do not report vacancies. These numbers are 57.8 and 59.2 percent in
natural resources and mining, 49.1 and 59.3 percent in retail trade, 47.7 and 54.2
percent in leisure and hospitality, 41.5 and 51.2 percent in transport, wholesales and
utilities, and lastly, 54.5 and 70.6 percent in other service sectors. On the contrary,
some other sectors, such as manufacturing, education and health seem to attract
8I calculate the average vacancy filling probability using Robert Shimer’s data for the period
1951-2004. See the next section for further details.
9They choose this target a priori.
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workers primarily by posting vacancies. In light of this evidence, I relate the firms
in these sectors to high-wage firms in the model, while relating the rest to low-wage
firms. Krause and Lubik (2010) set the vacancy creation cost ratio γg
γb
to 4, argu-
ing that vacancy creation costs are linked to the capital intensities of sectors and
that the difference between the capital intensity of average high-wage and low-wage
jobs is around this level. They do not include capital in their model. However,
capital is modeled in my framework; and therefore, I take vacancy creation costs
to represent explicit costs of recruitment, such as job advertising, hiring recruiters,
screening, interviewing, etc. I am not aware of any data source that reports ac-
tual vacancy creation costs in different sectors. In the baseline calibration I set the
vacancy creation cost ratio to 3 in order to generate a moderate wage differential
across the sectors. I perform sensitivity analysis by varying this ratio and propose
an alternative calibration strategy in Subsection 2.7.3.
Next, I set the total production share of low-wage firms % based on the sectoral
classification described above. Using employment shares reported in Davis, Faber-
man and Haltiwanger (2010), I calculate the total employment share of the sectors
with the lowest propensity to post vacancies as 40 percent.10 I use this value to set
the steady-state employment share of low-wage firms to 40 percent. The resulting
share of low-wage output in final goods production then becomes 0.4.
The unemployment benefit level d is 0.6, which is calibrated to match a ratio
10Employment shares are 5.3 percent in construction, 0.5 percent in natural resources and mining,
11.4 percent in retail trade, 9.3 percent in leisure and hospitality, 8 percent in transport, wholesales
and utilities, and 4.1 percent in other service sectors.
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of benefits to average wages of 0.7. The chosen value for this ratio lies between the
two extreme calibration targets used in Shimer (2005) and Hagedorn and Manovskii
(2008).
Finally, the standard deviation of the log of the aggregate technology shock is
0.0074, which is calibrated to replicate the observed standard deviation of the total
output in the sample.
2.5.3 Impulse Responses
I begin my analysis by studying the dynamic properties of the major labor
market variables in the three-state model without on-the-job search, which is very
similar to the model presented in Tripier (2003). The on-the-job search model
described in this study converges to this simpler model when there is no employed
search, that is, s = 0 and firms are homogenous.11 I study the dynamics of this
basic model in response to a 1 standard deviation positive productivity shock. The
resulting impulse response functions are shown in Figure 2.1. Impulse responses are
reported as percentage deviations from the steady state values.
On impact, the positive productivity shock leads to an increase in the output
level. Firms open more vacancies and the job finding probability of workers increases,
which results in higher overall employment. But, note that unemployment also
11The calibration strategy used to determine the parameters for this simplified model is identical
to the calibration strategy used to set the parameters of the model with on-the-job search described
above. There is no endogenous separation and the exogenous separation rate is set to 0.1 as in the
earlier studies.
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Figure 2.1: Impulse Responses for the Economy Without On-the-Job Search: %
Deviations from the Steady State
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increases sharply. This is due to the fact that the household sends more members
to participate in the labor market, since it is a good time to engage in market
work rather than home production. The number of searchers increases as labor
force participation goes up. Since it takes time to form matches, not all searchers
can find jobs; therefore, unemployment increases. Over time, as the newly-opened
vacancies get filled by workers, unemployment falls quickly to a level around its
steady state value. This results in a lower incentive for firms to open vacancies,
so vacancy creation goes down quickly as well. Both investment and employment
follow the output level, increasing on impact and then slowly returning to their
steady state levels.
Next, I consider the dynamic properties of the model with on-the-job search
developed in this chapter. Job searchers now include not only the unemployed, but
also the employed agents who would like to work at better-paying jobs. Impulse
responses of the economy to a 1 standard deviation positive productivity shock are
presented in Figures 2.2 and 2.3.
First, consider the responses of the aggregate variables. As shown in Figure 2.2,
aggregate output and investment both increase on impact in response to the positive
productivity shock. This leads to higher aggregate vacancy creation by firms. As in
the model without on-the-job search, the household sends more members to search
for jobs. The increased labor force participation with new searchers and the time
lag for match formations result in an initial increase in aggregate unemployment.
However, the subsequent evolution of unemployment is very different compared to
the previous case. As firms open more vacancies and workers’ job finding proba-
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Figure 2.2: Impulse Responses for the On-the-Job Search Economy - Aggregate
Variables: % Deviations from the Steady State
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Figure 2.3: Impulse Responses for the On-the-Job Search Economy - Comparison
of the Two Sectors: % Deviations from the Steady State
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bilities increase, job searchers become employed and the aggregate unemployment
level falls quickly below its steady state level. Unemployment stays below its steady
state level for a long time because vacancy creation remains high due to on-the-job
search. In the model without on-the-job search, the household’s only adjustment
mechanism to a favorable shock is changing the number of members participating
in the labor market. However, with on-the-job search, there is a second margin for
labor market adjustments to take place. As job finding rates increase, workers in
low-wage jobs get matched with better jobs that pay higher wages. This is why
job-to-job transitions increase substantially. Also, vacancy creation remains high,
as will become more clear below.
Now, consider the responses in the two sectors separately. As seen in Figure
2.3, the increases in output, employment and wages are higher at high-wage jobs
than at low-wage jobs. As workers flow from low-wage jobs to high-wage jobs, the
relative output in high-wage jobs increases, and in turn, the relative price of the bad
(low-wage) intermediate good increases. This leads to a higher incentive for low-
wage firms to keep posting vacancies. Within a few periods after the shock, vacancy
creation by high-wage firms falls sharply (similar to the evolution of vacancy creation
in the model without on-the-job search), but vacancy creation by low-wage firms
remains high.
Almost all the variation in aggregate unemployment is due to the evolution of
search effort among workers searching for high-wage jobs. On impact, as output and
vacancy creation increase in the high-wage sector, the employed searchers increase
their search intensity and move to high-wage jobs. Note that this search activity
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by the employed leads to congestion in the market for high-wage jobs. Therefore,
the unemployed searchers direct their search towards low-wage jobs, resulting in a
pronounced fall in the number of unemployed searching for high-wage jobs compared
to its steady state level. In contrast, with the increased flow of workers from low-
wage jobs to high-wage jobs, more job opportunities become available in the market
for low-wage jobs. In turn, the unemployed search in the market for low-wage jobs,
where competition is low. This keeps the demand for jobs, vacancy creation and
workers’ job finding rate high in this market.
2.6 U.S. Business Cycle Properties
Below compare the business cycle properties of the model to their empirical
counterparts. First, I construct quarterly U.S. business cycle statistics for the period
1951-2005. These empirical measures are computed using data from different sources
and are reported in Table 2.4.
Seasonally adjusted quarterly data on consumption and investment are taken
from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).12 Real aggregate consumption
is calculated as the sum of real personal consumption expenditures on non-durable
goods and services. Real aggregate investment corresponds to real gross private
domestic investment. To be consistent with my model, which omits government
purchases and trade, real aggregate GDP is calculated as the sum of these invest-
ment and consumption measures. Monthly data on the levels of employment, un-
12Available from the BEA website at http://www.bea.gov. I calculate the real series in billions
of chained (2005) dollars.
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employment and labor force participation are taken from the website of the Bureau
of Labor Statistics (BLS).13 The monthly series are transformed into quarterly fre-
quency by taking the average value for a quarter. Quarterly per person wage rates
are calculated as wage = compensation×output
employment×current$output using non-farm business series from
the BLS. The vacancy data come from the Conference Board’s Help Wanted Index.14
Quarterly averages of job finding and vacancy filling rates are taken from the data
set constructed by Robert Shimer (For additional details, see Shimer (2007) and
his webpage http://sites.google.com/site/robertshimer/research/flows). The corre-
sponding probabilities are then calculated as probability = 1− e−rate. All data series
are logged and detrended with the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter before the business
cycle statistics are calculated.15
The usual properties of the U.S. business cycle statistics are observed. Con-
sumption is half as volatile as output, while investment is 4 times as volatile as
output. Of the labor market variables, unemployment and labor market tightness
have the highest standard deviations. The volatility of unemployment is more than
7 times that of output, while labor market tightness is 15 times more volatile than
output. The least volatile variables are labor force participation and out of the labor
force, with relative standard deviations of 0.35 and 0.48, respectively. Finally, the
relative standard deviation of employment is 56 percent.
The cross-correlations show that consumption, investment, employment and
13See http://www.bls.gov/bls/employment.htm for more details.
14I borrow this data from the dataset used in Den Haan and Kaltenbrunner (2009), which is
publicly available at http://www1.feb.uva.nl/mint/wdenhaan/data.htm.
15The smoothing parameter is chosen as 105 given the criticism in Shimer (2005).
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labor market tightness are highly positively correlated with output, while unem-
ployment is highly negatively correlated with output. Labor force participation has
a small positive correlation with output, while the correlation between out of the
labor force and output is small and negative. Numerically, the cross-correlations
of output with employment, unemployment, labor force participation and out of
the labor force are 0.74, -0.76, 0.14 and -0.23, respectively. Unemployment is also
highly negatively correlated with vacancies, labor market tightness and workers’ job
finding probability, with cross-correlation values of -0.90, -0.97 and -0.95, respec-
tively. Vacancies are highly positively correlated with labor market tightness (0.98)
and workers’ job finding probability (0.92). Finally, firms’ vacancy filling probabil-
ity has a high positive correlation with unemployment (0.96) and a high negative
correlation with vacancies (-0.98).
2.7 Results and Discussion
2.7.1 Simulation Results
In this subsection, I present the simulation results for both the basic three-
state model without on-the-job search and the proposed on-the-job search economy.
I report the results in Tables 2.4 and 2.5, and compare them with the corresponding
U.S. business cycle statistics. The model statistics correspond to averages across
100 simulations of 220 periods (to match the quarterly data for the period 1951-
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2005).16 All series are logged and detrended with the Hodrick-Prescott filter before
the statistics are computed.17
Table 2.4: Business Cycle Statistics
a. Relative standard deviation ( σxσY )
U.S. BC Stats. Without OJS OJS Model
Output (Y) 1 1 1
Consumption (C) 0.56 0.39 0.31
Investment (I) 3.89 3.34 3.17
Employment (N) 0.56 0.56 0.56
Unemployment (U) 7.92 2.78 5.63
Labor Force (L) 0.35 0.65 0.39
Out of LF (OLF) 0.48 1.19 0.74
Wage Rate (W) 0.68 0.48 0.25 & 0.39
Market Tightness (θ) 15.89 1.62 14.57
b. Correlation with Output (ρx,Y )
Output (Y) 1 1 1
Consumption (C) 0.85 0.79 0.73
Investment (I) 0.92 0.97 0.96
Employment (N) 0.74 0.92 0.95
Unemployment (U) -0.76 -0.12 -0.59
Labor Force (L) 0.14 0.65 0.47
Out of LF (OLF) -0.23 -0.82 -0.48
Wage Rate (W) 0.58 0.92 0.95 & 0.93
Market Tightness (θ) 0.83 0.91 0.72
First I begin with the simulation results for the model without on-the-job
search. Table 2.4 shows that the relative volatilities of unemployment and labor
market tightness are small, whereas the relative volatility of labor force participation
16I generate 320 periods of data in each simulation, discard the first 100 periods and use the rest
for calculations.
17Again, the smoothing parameter is chosen as 105, given the criticism in Shimer (2005).
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Table 2.5: Cross-Correlations of the Major Labor Market Variables
a. U.S. Data
U V θ p q
U 1 -0.90 -0.97 -0.95 0.96
V - 1 0.98 0.92 -0.98
θ - - 1 0.96 -0.99
p - - - 1 -0.92
q - - - - 1
b. Without On-the-Job Search
U V θ p q
U 1 0.85 -0.13 -0.13 0.13
V - 1 0.41 0.41 -0.41
θ - - 1 0.99 -0.98
p - - - 1 -0.99
q - - - - 1
c. On-the-Job Search Model
U V θ p q s jtj flows
U 1 -0.34 -0.63 -0.58 0.58 -0.54 -0.51
V - 1 0.65 0.95 -0.94 0.89 0.84
θ - - 1 0.74 -0.73 0.82 0.87
p - - - 1 -0.99 0.90 0.85
q - - - - 1 -0.89 -0.84
s - - - - - 1 0.93
jtj flows - - - - - - 1
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is large compared to the data. The relative standard deviation of unemployment
is 2.78, which is 65 percent lower than the empirical value. Similarly, the relative
volatility of labor market tightness is only 1.62, which is 1/10 of the actual value.
The relative standard deviation of labor force participation is 0.65, which is almost
twice the actual level. The gap between the model generated and the actual statistics
is even more pronounced when out of the labor force is considered (1.19 vs. 0.48).
The model correlation of unemployment with output is only -0.12, compared
to -0.76 in the data. The correlation of unemployment with vacancies is high at
0.85, but has the opposite sign of its empirical counterpart. The correlations of
unemployment and vacancies with workers’ job finding probability are both small
in absolute value, corresponding to -0.13 and 0.41, respectively. The correlations
of unemployment and vacancies with firms’ vacancy filling probability are 0.13 and
-0.41, respectively; these numbers are again very small in absolute value compared
to the data values. Note that in the data unemployment is highly negatively corre-
lated with workers’ job finding probability (correlation is -0.95), while it is highly
positively correlated with firms’ vacancy filling probability (correlation is 0.96). The
opposite is true for vacancies (corresponding statistics are 0.92 and -0.98). Finally,
the correlations of labor force participation and out of the labor force with out-
put are too high in absolute value compared to the data values (0.65 vs. 0.14 for
participation, and -0.82 vs. -0.23 for out of the labor force, respectively).
These results support the conclusions of both Tripier (2003) and Veracierto
(2008). The simple three-state model fails to generate strongly countercyclical un-
employment and the Beveridge curve relationship between vacancies and unemploy-
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ment. Moreover, the model generated relative standard deviations of unemployment
and labor market tightness are too low, while the correlations of labor force partic-
ipation and out of the labor force with output are too high.
Next, I simulate the proposed on-the-job search model. The calculated results
for the relative standard deviations and the correlations of all major variables with
output are reported in the final column of Table 2.4, while the cross-correlations
are reported in Table 2.5. Again, the model statistics correspond to the averages
across 100 simulations of 220 periods; all series are logged and detrended with the
Hodrick-Prescott filter before the statistics are computed.
Compared to the previous model, the relative standard deviations of unem-
ployment and labor force participation implied by the on-the-job search model are
much more in line with their empirical counterparts. The relative standard devia-
tion of unemployment with respect to output is 5.63, which is a major improvement
compared to the generated value in the model without on-the-job search (2.78).
The relative volatility of labor force participation is 0.39, which is very close to the
observed value of 0.35. Another major improvement is seen in the relative volatility
of aggregate labor market tightness, which is 14.57 (compared to 1.62 previously),
close to the data value of 15.89.
As shown in Table 2.4, the model with on-the-job search predicts the corre-
lation of output and unemployment as -0.59. Although this is not as high as its
empirical counterpart of -0.76, the fact that the correlation is negative and large is
very important, since the three-state model without on-the-job search fails in this
dimension. The correlations of unemployment with workers’ job finding probability
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and firms’ vacancy filling probability are much higher at -0.58 and 0.58, which are
more in line with the data. The results are even more satisfactory when the corre-
lations of vacancies with job finding (0.95) and vacancy filling (-0.94) probabilities
are considered.
The model successfully reproduces the negative correlation between unem-
ployment and vacancies, also known as the Beveridge Curve relationship. This
correlation is -0.34, which is a major improvement relative to the correlation of 0.85
in the model without on-the-job search. The correlation of labor force participation
with output is lower compared to the previous model (0.47 vs. 0.65 earlier). A simi-
lar conclusion applies for the correlations between out of the labor force and output
(-0.48 and -0.82 for the model with and without on-the-job search, respectively). Fi-
nally, the model predicts search intensity and job-to-job flows to be highly positively
correlated with vacancies (0.89 and 0.84), labor market tightness (0.82 and 0.87) and
workers’ job finding probability (0.90 and 0.85). The correlations of search intensity
and job-to-job flows with unemployment (-0.54 and -0.51) and firms’ vacancy filling
probability (-0.89 and -0.84) are highly negative as expected.
Although the model is able to generate the Beveridge Curve relationship, the
simulated correlation between vacancies and unemployment is lower in absolute
value than the observed correlation in the data. The correlation of labor force
participation with output is lower compared to the value in the model without on-
the-job search, but it is still higher compared to the empirically observed value. The
comparison (in absolute value) is similar for the correlation between out of the labor
force and output. These shortcomings are mainly related to the endogenous par-
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ticipation assumption. Although part of the household’s labor market adjustments
occur through job-to-job transitions, the increase in the number of new searchers
following a favorable shock is still high. Lastly, the relative volatilities of wages
(especially in the low-wage sector) are found to be low, due to the dampened move-
ments in the labor market tightness in the high-wage sector, which will be discussed
in the next subsection.
2.7.2 Discussion
As mentioned earlier, the failure of the basic three-state model without on-
the-job search is mainly due to the high responsiveness of participation to aggregate
technology shocks. Therefore, I introduce an on-the-job search mechanism as an
additional adjustment margin for the household. The proposed model can generate
countercyclical unemployment, and it is more successful in matching the relative
volatilities of unemployment and labor market participation. Moreover, the model
predicts highly volatile aggregate labor market tightness, which is in line with the
U.S. data.
How does on-the-job search contribute to the model’s success? When a positive
productivity shock hits the economy, the incentive of the household to send more
workers to search for jobs increases. The incentive for higher labor force participation
increases because the return from market activities increases with the favorable
shock. However, on-the-job search works as an alternative margin for adjusting the
labor market activities of the household. With the positive productivity shock, the
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household allocates more time for on-the-job search. The increase in the on-the-job
search activity dampens the movements along the labor force participation margin.
The magnitude of the dampening effect depends on the time cost of on-the-job
search, which depends on the elasticity parameter in the search cost function. As the
elasticity σ goes from one to infinity, the cost of on-the-job search increases as well.
An extremely high level of σ corresponds to shutting down the on-the-job search
margin, so that the model becomes similar to the basic three-state model. Overall,
the relative volatilities of labor force participation and unemployment become closer
to their empirical counterparts due to the labor market movements generated by on-
the-job search.
Another important contribution of the on-the-job search mechanism is its im-
pact on the volatility of aggregate labor market tightness. The mechanism generates
highly volatile aggregate labor market tightness (θt = vt/ut) due to the high respon-
siveness of vacancy creation by low-wage firms. In order to further investigate this







Compared to the model without on-the-job search, this equation has the ad-
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Labor market tightness in the high-wage sector appears in the wage equation
for the low-wage jobs. Any increase in labor market tightness in the high-wage sector
results in a reduction of wages in the low-wage sector, since low-wage firms take into
account the possibility of losing a worker to a high-wage firm when bargaining for
wages. On-the-job search dampens the movements of labor market tightness in
the high-wage sector, which also corresponds to dampened movements of wages in
the low-wage sector. Since wages are more stable, low-wage firms continue to post
vacancies. Moreover, firms have diminishing marginal product of labor, therefore
losing a worker raises the marginal benefit of hiring for low-wage firms, which also
explains why vacancy creation remains high in this sector. Additionally, there is
high competition in the high-wage sector due to congestion caused by the employed
searchers. This leads to increased search activity by the unemployed in the low-wage
sector following a favorable shock. As more workers search for jobs in the low-wage
sector, firms continue to post vacancies. In turn, aggregate vacancy creation and
volatility of vacancies in the economy remain high, resulting in a highly responsive
aggregate labor market tightness. This helps all searchers to find jobs at a higher
rate. Therefore, a few periods after the positive aggregate technology shock hits
the economy, unemployment falls quickly below its steady state level and follows a
countercyclical pattern.
The persistence of high vacancy creation also explains why the model no longer
generates a high positive correlation between unemployment and vacancies. In fact,
the correlation now has the correct negative sign.
Lastly, it must be noted that the on-the-job search mechanism also affects rel-
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ative wages. Given that the vacancy creation cost is higher for the high-wage firms
and that both types of firms face downward-sloping demand, the wage rate has to
be higher in equilibrium in the high-cost sector than in the low-cost sector. This
wage difference provides the incentive for on-the-job search. Additionally, on-the-job
search has an effect on the difference between the wage rates. As long as the search





The maximum wage that a low-wage firm is willing to pay is lower, while the mini-
mum wage that the worker would accept is higher due to costly on-the-job search.
The decrease in the firm’s match value dominates the increase in the worker’s match
value. This is why the wage gap between the two sectors increases as the search
intensity increases.
2.7.3 Sensitivity Analysis
In this section, I perform some robustness checks on the model results by
varying the values of important parameters.
First, I change the elasticity parameter in the household’s preferences for home
production φ. As explained earlier, I calibrate this parameter to match the model-
generated relative volatility of employment to its empirical value. This is the calibra-
tion method used in Veracierto (2008) and Tripier (2003), and I follow this method
to make my results fully comparable to theirs.
Similar to this study, Ebell (2010) also aims to improve the puzzling counter-
factual results generated by the three-state model. She argues that an alternative
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calibration strategy allows the model to generate countercyclical unemployment and
a negative correlation between unemployment and vacancies observed in the data.
She proposes three alternative calibration techniques: calibrating the elasticity of
labor supply to match the relative volatility of labor force participation, the small
surplus calibration strategy used in Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008), and correcting
for a possible time aggregation problem by calibrating to weekly frequency. Since
the only common calibration element between this study and hers is the first one, I
explore how her strategy would affect the results presented here, by calibrating the
elasticity parameter φ to target for the relative volatility of labor force participation.
I present the resulting statistics in Table 2.6.
Note that, the on-the-job search mechanism introduced in this study already
keeps the participation margin stable, resulting in a low relative volatility of labor
force participation. Matching the exact data moment has almost no effect on the
results of the baseline calibration.
Table 2.6: Varying the Elasticity of Home Production
Current Calibration Ebell’s Calibration
φ =0.22 φ =0.26
σU/σY 5.63 5.62
σN/σY 0.56 0.54
σLF /σY 0.39 0.35
ρ(U, V ) -0.34 -0.36
ρ(U, Y ) -0.59 -0.61
ρ(N,Y ) 0.95 0.96
ρ(LF, Y ) 0.47 0.46
Next, I examine how varying the elasticity of search cost σ affects the results.
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The target for this parameter is the relative volatility of employer-to-employer flows.
Any increase in this elasticity parameter results mainly in reductions in the relative
volatilities of job-to-job flows and labor market tightness. On the contrary, as σ
approaches one from above, these variables become highly volatile.
Finally, I vary the only free parameter of my calibration, which is the ratio of
the vacancy creation costs γ
g
γb
. In the current calibration the vacancy creation cost
for high-wage firms is three times the cost for low-wage firms. This value is chosen
to be high enough to guarantee a moderate wage difference across the two sectors.
On the one hand, a reduction in the ratio of the vacancy creation costs leads to a
decrease in the wage difference across the two sectors and dampens the volatilities of
job-to-job flows, unemployment and labor market tightness. On the other hand, an
increase in this ratio increases the responsiveness of job-to-job flows, unemployment
and labor market tightness without leading to any significant changes in the degree
of countercyclicality of unemployment or the Beveridge Curve relationship.
A better way to choose this parameter would be to use micro level data to
obtain a wage differential estimate by running a regression of wages of all workers on
sectoral dummies and control variables. This regression would give a ratio between
the wages paid in the sectors that heavily depend on vacancy creation (such as
manufacturing, education, etc.) and the wages paid in the sectors that depend
less on vacancy creation (such as construction, retail trade, etc.). Then, the ratio of
vacancy creation costs can be calibrated by targeting the estimated wage differential.
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2.7.4 Comparison with Krause and Lubik (2010)
As I mention earlier, I follow Krause and Lubik (2010) in modeling the on-
the-job search mechanism. Krause and Lubik (2010) introduce on-the-job search
into the basic two-state search and matching model in order to address the Shimer
(2005) puzzle. Shimer (2005) points that the two-state model underpredicts the
volatilities of vacancies, unemployment and labor market tightness. This problem
arises because the bargained wage rates follow labor market tightness closely. When
a favorable shock hits the economy, labor market tightness increases quickly as
the unemployed find jobs, which reduces the firms’ incentives to create vacancies.
Krause and Lubik (2010) argue that the on-the-job search mechanism dampens
the movements in labor market tightness, which leads to more stable wages. In
turn, firms continue to create vacancies for longer periods. Their results show that
the two-state model enriched with on-the-job search is successful in generating the
observed volatilities of unemployment, vacancies and the vacancy-unemployment
ratio.
While Krause and Lubik (2010) use on-the-job search to improve the short-
comings of the two-state search and matching model, I use the same mechanism
to improve the business cycle properties of the three-state model. In the frame-
work developed here, the primary role of the on-the-job search mechanism is to
dampen the movements along the labor market participation margin. Additionally,
the mechanism also helps to keep the wage rates more stable, which in turn helps
vacancy creation rate to remain high. Overall, the proposed model is able to gen-
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erate countercyclical unemployment and the observed negative correlation between
unemployment and vacancies. Quantitatively, the two-state model with on-the-job
search developed in Krause and Lubik (2010) is more successful (than the proposed
three-state model with on-the-job search) in matching the observed volatilites and
cross-correlations, such as those of and between unemployment and vacancies. This
result is not surprising, since the simple two-state model is already superior to the
simple three-state model in terms of matching the observed business cycle statistics.
2.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, I develop a general equilibrium business cycle model with la-
bor market frictions, endogenous labor force participation and on-the-job search.
Previous studies that incorporate endogenous labor force participation into a real
business cycle framework with labor market frictions find that the model fails to
replicate the labor market dynamics observed in the U.S. data. In order to improve
the shortcomings of the three-state model, I enrich it with an on-the-job search
mechanism that leads to job-to-job flows, which are important elements of the U.S.
labor market. I show that the on-the-job search mechanism helps the model to
generate countercyclical unemployment and the negative correlation between un-
employment and vacancies observed in the data. Quantitatively, the business cycle
statistics reproduced by the model presented in this study are more in line with
their empirical counterparts.
Previous studies had pointed the importance of considering the participation
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margin in models focusing on labor markets dynamics. However, the failure of the
earlier attempts to incorporate the participation margin in real business cycle models
with search frictions had been discouraging. This study serves as a promising step.
It shows that incorporating an on-the-job search mechanism into the simple three-
state model can significantly improve the model’s performance in matching the key
quantitative facts on the cyclical properties of important labor market variables.
Therefore, it suggests that it would be worthwhile to build richer models in this
direction.
The model and calibration presented here can be extended in several ways.
First, in the current setup, the source of heterogeneity between firms is the difference
in the vacancy creation costs. Given the data limitations, it is not an easy task to
calculate an empirical value for the difference between the vacancy creation costs
in different sectors. In the benchmark calibration, I choose this value to generate a
moderate wage differential across sectors. A better approach would be to determine
the wage ratio between the sectors using empirical analysis. Then, the ratio of
vacancy creation costs could be calibrated by targeting the estimated wage ratio.
Second, the model assumes that all workers are homogenous. It would be interesting
to introduce worker heterogeneity (for example, heterogeneity due to skill differences
or human capital accumulation) to motivate better the directed search assumed here.
These issues remain for future research.
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Chapter 3
Under-Investment in State Capacity: The Role of Inequality and
Political Instability
3.1 Introduction
The most commonly known and the earliest definition of state capacity is
the state’s power to raise tax revenues. As documented in Acemoglu (2005) and
Acemoglu, Ticchi and Vindigni (2010), tax revenues constitute only a small portion
of GDP in developing countries, such as those in Latin America, Asia and sub-
Saharan Africa. The important consequence of the state’s inability to collect taxes
is the limited provision of public goods and services, which are crucial for the well-
being and the living standards of its citizens, especially those of the poor. If the
level of economic development and the welfare of a country are closely related to
state capacity, it is critical to understand why certain countries have a low state
capacity problem. What are the main determinants of the level of state capacity?
When do governments under-invest in state capacity? These are the main questions
we aim to answer in this study.
We present a two-period, two-group political economy model based on the
theoretical framework developed in Besley and Persson (2009). We name the two
groups as elites and citizens, assuming the elites to be the minority group. In each
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period, the group holding political power chooses its policy vector of taxes, spending
in public goods and the level of investment in state capacity. The maximum tax
rate is determined by the level of state capacity, which can be increased with costly
investments by the government. We associate political inequality with autocratic
political systems. Specifically, in a fully democratic political system, the utility
weights are equal to the population shares. We assume that the system is politically
unequal when the utility of a particular group is weighted disproportionately. We
also allow for political instability, and assume that the political system is unstable
if the ruling group is likely to lose political power to the opponent group, which can
occur as a result of a civil war.
We first investigate how the incidence and the risk of external wars, as well as
political inequality and stability, shape the government’s decision to invest in state
capacity. Then, we include income inequality to analyze its effect on the investment
decision.
Our main theoretical results indicate that the effects of external and civil
wars go in the opposite directions. While the future risk of fighting external wars
calls for building stronger state capacity, fighting civil wars (which is a measure of
political instability) causes the government to invest less in state capacity. In the
case of an external war, it is in the government’s best interest to invest in state
capacity, to be able to tax both groups at the maximum possible rate, and use
these resources to increase spending in public goods (e.g., defense). However, if the
country is fighting a civil war, the political system is highly unstable. In this case,
the government’s actions are myopic, so the future benefit of having higher state
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capacity is low. Therefore, political instability (proxied with the incidence of civil
wars, or with the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown
by unconstitutional or violent means) leads to lower investment in state capacity.
In the case of political inequality, our model predicts that more democratic political
systems (lower political inequality) invest more in state capacity. Furthermore, all
of these results are independent of which group holds political power.
When we allow for income inequality, the investment decision becomes group-
specific. More precisely, when the elites are in power, in the presence of political
instability, both income and political inequality lead to lower investment in state
capacity. Conversely, if the citizens are the rulers, our theory predicts that the
combination of high political and income inequality results in higher state capacity.
However, this is not always the case. Under some circumstances, inequality can
result in low investment in state capacity, which could be taken as a model of failed
social revolutions.
We empirically test the model’s main predictions by applying econometric
methods on cross-sectional data. We use several different measures to proxy for state
capacity, which cover different and complementary aspects, ranging from fiscal to
bureaucratic dimensions. Our empirical results support the theoretical predictions.
We find that higher incidence of external wars and political stability (lower inci-
dence of civil wars or lower likelihood that the government will be destabilized) are
associated with higher state capacity. On the contrary, inequality (political and/or
income) is negatively correlated with state capacity. We also consider the interac-
tions of income inequality with political stability and democracy. The estimation
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results indicate that, when there is income inequality, the magnitudes of the positive
correlations of democracy and political stability with state capacity are significantly
reduced.
The organization of this chapter is as follows: Section 3.2 reviews the related
literature. Section 3.3 introduces the model and discusses the theoretical results.
In Section 3.4, we explain in detail the data we use, present the empirical evidence
and discuss the regression results. Finally, Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Related Literature
Our study is related to three strands of literature. The first strand focuses on
the effects of wars on formation and development of state capacity. In one of the
earliest studies in this line, Tilly (1990) argues that international wars cause gov-
ernments to build and invest in state capacity. In order to fight wars, governments
need to raise military expenditures, for which more tax revenues have to be col-
lected. The experiences of the countries like Britain and the United States support
this view, since these countries strengthened their tax systems during the first and
the second World Wars.
While external wars have drawn attention for building stronger states, it is
misleading to extend the argument for the case of internal wars, or civil wars.1
Consider, for example, Latin American countries, where external wars have been
rare, while civil wars have been common and long-lasting. Yet, there has been
1See Blattman and Miguel (2010) for an extensive literature survey on the causes and conse-
quences of civil wars.
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limited investment in state capacity. Amongst others, Centeno (2002) argues that
state capacity has remained low in Latin America because civil wars have been
highly destructive. Besley and Persson (2008) find evidence that this result is not
limited to Latin America, but appears to be a general consequence of civil wars.
In line with this literature, we consider the effects of wars on the government’s
decision to invest in state capacity. Yet, we argue that the incidence of wars are
not the only causes of state capacity differences across countries. There is also a
strong negative relationship between state capacity and the levels of political and
income inequality. In order to fully grasp the low state capacity problem, we revisit
inequality both theoretically and empirically.
Political and development economists have studied extensively the links be-
tween income and political inequality and the level of economic development and
growth. Some important examples are Alesina and Rodrik (1994), Persson and
Tabellini (1994) and Barro (2000) on income inequality; and Acemoglu and Robin-
son (2000, 2006), Persson and Tabellini (2006) and Acemoglu (2005) on political
inequality. Yet, the relationship between inequality and state capacity is not well
documented. Our work fills this important gap in the literature by studying the
effects of political and income inequality on the government’s decision to invest in
state capacity. Moreover, we present a unified theoretical framework, where the
interactions of the two inequality measures can be analyzed.
Lastly, our work contributes to the literature on institutions. Earlier studies,
such as Knack and Keefer (1995), Hall and Jones (1999) and Engerman and Sokoloff
(2000), present strong empirical evidence on the positive effect of institutional qual-
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ity on economic growth, development and wealth of countries. Moreover, they find
that institutions persist. But, why do the economic institutions differ across coun-
tries and why do they persist? One important explanation is provided by Acemoglu,
Johnson and Robinson (2001), who find that colonial origins are important exoge-
nous elements that lead to persistent differences between economic institutions. Our
study complements their study by treating institutions as endogenous and analyzing
the conditions that lead to persistently low investment in state capacity.
Our study is closely linked to and builds on the recent work by Besley and
Persson (2009), who develop a framework where policy choices in market regulation
and taxation are constrained by state capacity, as well as the economic institutions
inherited from the past. They analyze the economic and political determinants of
the government’s choice to invest in building legal and fiscal state capacity. Their
results show that fighting external wars, political stability and inclusive political
institutions are central for building state capacity. Moreover, they find that legal
and fiscal capacity are complements.
The important differences between this study and Besley and Persson (2009)
are as follows. First, we restrict the definition of state capacity to fiscal capacity.
This enables us to analyze the interactions between political and income inequality
in a simpler framework. Second, while they focus on the complementarity and the
substitutability between fiscal and legal capacity of the state, our main aim is to
analyze the individual and combined effects of democracy, income inequality and
political stability on state capacity. Third, we present a more detailed comparison
between the investment decision and the effects of the determinants of state capacity
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when the government is run by different income groups (elites and citizens). This is
important, because low state capacity is a feature of many failed social revolutions.
3.3 Theoretical Model and Simulations
3.3.1 The Environment
As we mentioned previously, our model follows closely the model in Besley and
Persson (2009). Time is discrete and consists of two periods, s = 1, 2. There are two
groups of agents in the economy, J = A, B. In each period, one group, say group
A, holds political power (becomes the government), and makes the taxation and
government spending decisions. Groups differ in their population shares βA and βB,
and may also differ in their per capita income levels Y A and Y B. Total population is
normalized to unity. Agents in a given group have the same preferences and income
levels. All agents derive utility from consuming private goods that they purchase
with their after-tax income and public goods provided by the government.
We denote group-specific tax rates (tAs and t
B
s ), and allow them to take negative
values in order to make full redistribution possible. The maximum tax rate is
determined by the stock of state capacity in each period. As in Besley and Persson
(2009), we assume that the capacity to tax depends on the previous investments
in building institutions, such as the Internal Revenue Service in the United States,
which manages and monitors taxation. The government takes the stock of the first
period state capacity τ1 as given and decides the level of investment in state capacity
4τ = τ2 − τ1, which determines the level of state capacity in the second period. The
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stock of state capacity does not depreciate, but in order to have a higher level of
state capacity in the second period, the government needs to make a non-negative
investment in the first period.2 The cost of investment takes a functional form
F (4τ), which is increasing and strictly convex in the level of investment 4τ , and
has the properties F (0) = F ′(0) = 0. The investment in state capacity is part of the
government spending, and takes place only in the first period, since the world ends
at the end of the second period.
The government also uses its resources to provide public goods Gs, from which
both groups benefit. The value given to public goods in the utility function is
denoted by αs, which is a continuous random variable with c.d.f H and p.d.f h
on the interval [0, α], where α ≥ 1.3 In order to illustrate the stochastic valuation
assumption, consider defense as an example of a public good. If a country engages in
an external war, defense becomes very valuable, and it is optimal for the government
to increase military spending. In the absence of such a conflict, defense is valued
less, and the government spends less or no resources for the provision of this public
good.
3.3.2 The General Problem
Next, we set up the optimization problem of the group in power, or the gov-
ernment, in each period. Here is the timing of events:
1. Nature determines the value of public goods αs and which group (A) holds
2We assume that 4τ ≥ 0.
3More specifically, α1 is given and α2 is unknown as of period 1.
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the political control.
2. The government picks its policy vector of taxes tJs , spending on public goods Gs
and the level of investment in state capacity 4τ .
3. Agents consume.
Assuming that preferences are linear in private consumption and public goods





= αsGs + (1− tJs )Y J (3.1)
The government chooses the policy vector that maximizes the sum of the
weighted utilities of the two groups. In the case of a utilitarian government, or
a fully democratic political system, the weights should be equal to the population
shares of the two groups. Yet, many countries do not have fully democratic systems,
but rather function as partial democracies, which implies some form of political
inequality. In this case, the weights are not equal to the population shares, but
instead are the population shares multiplied by two new parameters ρ and ρ, which
represent the political weights the government gives to each group. Therefore, the
total weight the group in power attaches to its own utility becomes ρβA, while that
for the opponent group becomes ρβB. We say that the system is politically unequal if
the group in power favors its own members, which corresponds to ρ > 1 and ρ < 1.
From now on, we will assume that ρ ≥ 1 and ρ ≤ 1, and define our measure of
political inequality as ψ = ρ− ρ. By assumption, the sum of the weights attached
to the groups’ utilities should satisfy ρβA + ρβB = 1. Under a fully democratic
political system, there should be no political inequality; therefore, we should have
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ψ = 0. In this case, each group’s weight in the utility is equal to its share in the
population, so that ρ = ρ = 1.
Now, we can write down the first period problem of the government as:










= max{G1,tA1 ,tB1 ,4τ} (ρβ
A+ρβB)α1G1+ρβ





JY J = G1 + F (4τ) (3.4)
G1 ≥ 0 and τ1 ≥ tJ1 (3.5)
where ENP stands for the second period Expected Net Payoff for the group ruling in
the first period. This is an expected payoff because the outcome depends on which
group holds power in the second period. In what follows, we assume that the ruling
group keeps political power in the second period with an exogenous probability of
γ. That is, a higher γ means greater political stability.
Similarly, the second period maximization problem of the government is:










= max{G2,tA2 ,tB2 } α2G2 + ρβ





JY J = G2 (3.8)
G2 ≥ 0 and τ2 ≥ tJ2 (3.9)
As in the first period maximization problem, the ruling group takes the value
of public goods α2 and the level of state capacity τ2 as given, and chooses the optimal
level of tax rates and public goods provision.
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Before we move on to the results of the maximization problem, let’s have
a closer look at the indirect utility that the government maximizes in the second
period. Assuming that the constraint G2 ≥ 0 is non-binding, substituting Equation
(3.8) into Equation (3.7) gives:
[
ρβAY A + ρβBY B
]
+ βAtA2 Y
A(α2 − ρ) + βBtB2 Y B(α2 − ρ) (3.10)
Note that in order to maximize Equation (3.7) with the choice of any positive
provision of public goods in the second period, the condition α2 ≥ ρ has to be
satisfied.4 That is, public goods are provided only when the value of public goods
is greater than or equal to the value that the group in power assigns to its own
private consumption. Given the cumulative distribution of the stochastic variable
α2, this event occurs with probability [1−H(ρ)]. Conversely, when α2 < ρ, the
ruling group values public goods less than its own private consumption and, hence,
finds it optimal to set G = 0. This occurs with probability H(ρ). To summarize, the
value attached to public goods determines whether the government provides public
goods, or not. If public goods are provided, then we name the state of the world as
‘Common Interest State’. If no public goods are provided, then the world is in the
‘Redistribution State’, for the reasons that will become clear once we lay out the
maximization results.
4Since ρ ≥ ρ, this condition also guarantees that α2 ≥ ρ holds.
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3.3.3 Optimal Taxation and Public Goods Provision
Since the maximization problem of the government is linear in the policy
variables, we can analyze the optimal taxation and public goods provision decisions
separately from the optimal investment in state capacity decision. We first present
the optimal tax rates and public goods provision chosen by the government in each
state of the world.
If αs ≥ ρ, then we are at the common interest state, which is observed with
probability [1−H(ρ)]. In this case, the optimal policy is:
tA1 = τ1, t
B
1 = τ1 (3.11)
tA2 = τ2, t
B











Intuitively, since public goods are valued highly, the government taxes both
groups at the maximum rate and uses the collected resources for the provision of
public goods in both periods and investment in state capacity in the first period.
If αs < ρ, then we are at the redistribution state, which occurs with probability
H(ρ), and the optimal policy becomes:
tA1 =
F (4τ)− τ1βBY B
βAY A




, tB2 = τ2 (3.16)
G1 = 0, G2 = 0 (3.17)
In this case, the value attached to public goods is low; therefore, the group in power
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is only interested in the redistribution of resources. For this purpose, it taxes the
opponent group at the maximum possible rate and redistributes the tax revenues
amongst its own group members.
3.3.4 Optimal Investment in State Capacity
In order to solve for the optimal investment level, we need to write down the
second period Expected Net Payoff (ENP) in detail. The ruling group of the first
period is assumed to keep political power in the second period with probability γ,
and lose it to the opponent group otherwise. For each case, we use the optimal
taxation and public goods provision results presented above to calculate the second
period expected payoff for the first period’s ruling group. When the group continues
to rule in the second period, its expected payoff is:




βAY A + βBY B
]















Y A + ρβB(1− τ2)Y B
}
(3.18)
The first term on the right hand side stands for the sum of the weighted utilities
of the two groups in the common interest state, where both groups are taxed at the
maximum amount, public goods are provided and investment in state capacity takes
place. The first part presents the total utility derived by the two groups from the
provision of public goods. The second part is the sum of the after-tax income of the
two groups, weighted by the parameters chosen by the ruling group. The second
term stands for the total utility in the redistribution state, where the group in power
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taxes the opponent group at the maximum rate, in order to redistribute resources to
its own members. No public goods are provided in this state. The opponent group
loses a share of its income due to taxation, whereas the group in power receives the
collected taxes and consumes more than its period income.
When the ruling group loses political power to the opponent group, its ex-
pected payoff becomes:




βAY A + βBY B
]


















The weights in this expected payoff correspond to the values set by the first
period’s ruling group, assuming that it no longer runs the government in the second
period. Note that the only difference between Equations (3.18) and (3.19) is the
last term. When the ruling group loses power to the opponent group, its members
get taxed at the maximum rate, and the new ruling group collects the tax revenues.
Now, we can define the Expected Net Payoff (ENP) as:
ENP = γV 12 + (1− γ)V 22 − λ(α1)F (4τ) (3.20)
where λ(α1) = max{α1, ρ} is the Lagrange Multiplier associated with the govern-
ment’s budget constraint in the first period maximization problem. The sum of the
first two terms in the ENP corresponds to the benefit derived from investing in state
capacity, whereas the last term is the cost of investment in terms of the value of
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public funds. When we substitute in the payoff values, the ENP becomes:
ENP = [1−H(ρ)] τ2
[
βAY A + βBY B
]
E {α2|α2 ≥ ρ}+H(ρ)
[
ρβAY A + ρβBY B
]
+ [1−H(ρ)] (1− τ2)
[




γβBY B − (1− γ)βAY A
]
−λ(α1)F (4τ) (3.21)
In order to determine the optimal level of investment, we go back to the first
period maximization problem and write down the first order condition with respect
to 4τ , which corresponds to the derivative of the ENP with respect to 4τ . We call





βAY A + βBY B
]
E {α2|α2 ≥ ρ}
− [1−H(ρ)]
[




γβBY B − (1− γ)βAY A
]
(3.22)
Equation (3.22) shows that the optimal level of investment in state capacity
4τ depends on the main parameters of the model, namely, α1, α2, and γ, as well
as the level of inequality. In the next subsection, we investigate the relationship
between these variables and the investment decision.
3.3.5 Predictions of the Benchmark Model
This section presents the effects of the key variables of the model on the state
capacity investment decision of the government. For this purpose, we begin with
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the above presented benchmark model, where we only allow for political inequality.
Later on, we will also introduce income inequality.
In the benchmark model, the two groups differ only in the population shares.
We denote the variables related to the ruling group with the superscript A. We
assume that the members of each group have the same income levels, that is
Y A = Y B = Y . When the elites are in power, we have βA < βB, while this as-
sumption changes to βA > βB when the citizens are in power. We say that there
is political instability if the ruling group’s probability of keeping political power in
the second period is less than or equal to its population share γ ≤ βA. Lastly, we
denote the level of political inequality with ψ = ρ− ρ. The results to be presented
in Propositions 1-4 do not depend on which group holds political power.
Proposition 3.1. As the expected demand for public goods (or the future risk of
an external conflict) increases, investment in state capacity increases as well.
Proof. A increase in the second period demand for public goods, or a first order
stochastically dominating shift in α2, results in a higher value of E {α2|α2 ≥ ρ}. To
see the effect of this change on the investment level, take the derivative of the OPT
equality with respect to E {α2|α2 ≥ ρ}. This yields to ∂(4τ)∂(E{α2|α2≥ρ}) =
[1−H(ρ)]Y
λ(α1)F ′′(4τ) ,
which is positive. QED.
Our first result is very intuitive. When the government foresees that public
goods will be more valuable in the second period, it is optimal to increase the stock
of state capacity, so that higher tax revenues can be raised and more public goods
can be provided. A good example of this case would be an increased expectation of
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an external conflict in the second period. In this case, the government would like
to increase military spending, which calls for building up the tax base in the first
period, in order to be able to collect more resources from all groups in the second
period.
Proposition 3.2. A higher current value of public goods (or a higher current
threat of an external conflict) leads to lower investment in state capacity.





λ(α1)F ′′(4τ) , which is negative. QED.
This result is exactly the opposite of the first result, but the intuition is the
same. If public goods are valued highly in the first period, then the government
uses the collected resources immediately to increase the public goods provision,
which results in fewer resources left for investment in state capacity. An example
similar to the previous one would be the case where the country is involved in an
external war in the first period. The military expenses become the government’s
priority; therefore, the collected resources are used for the provision of this public
good immediately.
Proposition 3.3. A higher level of political stability increases investment in
state capacity.




λ(α1)F ′′(4τ) , which is positive. QED.
If the government is likely to be in power in the second period, then the
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incentive to expand the tax base in the first period is high. There is no discounting;
therefore, it is the government’s best interest to invest in state capacity to be able to
raise more tax revenues in the second period, which will lead to higher public goods
provision or redistribution. By contrast, if the government is less likely to remain
in power, it resists increasing state capacity, because it recognizes the possibility of
paying redistributive taxes next period. Therefore, investment in state capacity is
higher in a more stable political environment.
Proposition 3.4. In the presence of political instability, as political inequality
increases, investment in state capacity decreases.
Proof. See Appendix B.1.
If the group in power is likely to lose authority to the opponent group in the
second period, then its first period actions are myopic. In addition, if the group also
favors its own members, it values the redistribution of resources in the current period
more than building a higher state capacity stock and raising higher tax revenues in
the second period. Therefore, regardless of which group holds the power, if there is
political instability, higher political inequality results in lower investment in state
capacity. However, if the political system is stable, that is if γ > βA, then higher
political inequality may lead to higher investment in state capacity. In other words,
if the ruling group is highly likely to keep political power in the second period, it is
optimal to expand the tax base in the first period, to be able to raise higher taxes in
the second period. Note that, when the value of ψ increases, the probability of being
in the redistribution state H(ρ) also increases. A higher level of state capacity, or
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an expanded tax base, enables the ruling group to tax the other group at a higher
tax rate in the second period and redistribute higher tax revenues amongst its own
group members.
3.3.6 Predictions of the Benchmark Model with Income Inequality
Now, we introduce income inequality to our benchmark model. We still assume
that all agents in a given group have the same income levels, but per capita income
levels of the two groups are no longer equal to each other. More specifically, we
let the elites have a per capita income level of Y + ε, and the citizens have a per
capita income level of Y − ε, where Y > ε > 0. We name refer to ε as our measure
of income inequality.
First, consider the case where the elites are in power. The main assumptions
are:
Y A = Y + ε, Y B = Y − ε and βA < βB
In this setting, Propositions 1-3 continue to hold, and additionally we get Proposi-
tions 5-7 on the effects of the inequality measures on the investment decision:
Proposition 3.5. When the elites are in power and there is political instability,
a higher level of political inequality leads to lower investment in state capacity.
Proof. See Appendix B.1.
As in Proposition 3.4, if there is political instability, then the elites choose to
redistribute resources in the current period rather than using resources to invest in
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state capacity. First, since the elites hold the greater share of the total income, the
expected benefit of raising higher tax revenues in the second period is low, which
lowers the group’s incentive to expand the tax base. Second, when the elites value
the benefits of their group more and they are likely to lose political power in the
second period, it is optimal to take advantage of the collected resources in the first
period and redistribute immediately.
Proposition 3.6. When the elites are in power, as income inequality increases
investment in state capacity decreases.
Proof. See Appendix B.1.
When income inequality is high, the elites hold a greater part of the total
income. They choose to invest less in expanding the tax base for two reasons.
First, the amount of resources that they can collect from the citizens is limited.
Therefore, they find it more profitable to redistribute resources immediately, rather
than building state capacity in the first period. Second, an increased tax base
translates into a higher loss of income by the elites, if they lose power to the citizens
in the second period. Mainly due to the fear of being taxed at a higher rate in the
second period, the elites use the collected resources for immediate redistribution and
invest less in state capacity.
Proposition 3.7. When the elites are in power, higher income inequality reduces
the positive effect of political stability on investment in state capacity.
Proof. See Appendix B.1.
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In Proposition 3.3, we stated that greater political stability increases the gov-
ernment’s incentive to invest in state capacity. However, since income inequality
has an adverse effect on the investment decision when the elites are in power, it de-
creases the positive impact of political stability. As income inequality increases, the
tax revenues that the elites can collect from the citizens next period become more
limited. Therefore, the expected benefit from investing in state capacity decreases,
which reduces the elites’ incentive to expand the tax base.
Now, consider the case where the citizens are the ruling group. The above
assumptions change as:
Y A = Y − ε, Y B = Y + ε and βA > βB
Propositions 3.1-3.4 and 3.7 continue to hold, but we see some changes in
Propositions 3.5 and 3.6.5
Proposition 3.8. When the citizens are in power, there is political instability
and income inequality is low, higher political inequality leads to lower investment in
state capacity. However, if income inequality is high, then higher political inequality
leads to higher investment in state capacity.
Proof. See Appendix B.1.
Proposition 3.9. When the citizens are in power and political inequality is low,
higher income inequality decreases investment in state capacity. However, if polit-
ical inequality is high, then higher income inequality increases investment in state
5See the Appendix for further explanation on how Proposition 3.7 holds when the citizens rule.
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capacity.
Proof. See Appendix B.1.
Propositions 3.8 and 3.9 state that when the citizens are in power, the effects
of the inequality measures on the investment decision depend mainly on the inter-
actions between them. We will elaborate more on these propositions in the next
subsection.
3.3.7 Numerical Comparative Statics
To illustrate the propositions of the previous subsection, and more specifically,
to shed light on the conditional results presented in Propositions 3.8 and 3.9, we
examine the optimality condition for investment numerically. Our aim is to see how
the level of investment in state capacity changes as ψ, ε and γ vary. First, we gener-
ate two initial benchmarks (one for each group running the government), where there
is positive investment in state capacity. The parametrization for the benchmarks
is explained in detail below. Then, we let the political stability and the inequality
measures vary, in order to illustrate the results presented in the Propositions.
We choose the parameter values used in the benchmarks by matching some
data averages. Accordingly, we set the population share of the elites to 20 percent.
The average per capita income level is normalized to unity. We let α be a stochastic
variable with truncated normal distribution on the interval [0, 5], with mean 1 and
standard deviation 1.2. The value of public goods in the first period α1 is assigned
to be 1.
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We assume that, when the elites are in power, the total weights of the groups in
the utility function are chosen to be close to the income shares, ρβA ∼ βAY A
βAY A+βBY B
and ρβB ∼ βBY B
βAY A+βBY B
. That is, there is some political inequality. We further
assume that the top quantile in the population, the elites, get 40 percent of the
total income. Therefore, when the elites rule, ρβA is assigned a value close to this
level (the exact value that we set is 0.34, which makes ρβB equal to 0.66). Then, ρ
becomes 1.72 and ρ becomes 0.82, which gives a political inequality measure ψ of 0.9.
Using the assumed population and income shares of the two groups, we calculate
the consistent income inequality measure ε, which is 0.45. With these parameter
values, the probability of being in the common interest state in the second period
[1−H(ρ)] becomes 0.15.
When the citizens are in power, we arbitrarily set the total utility weight for
citizens ρβA to be 0.94, which is greater than the group’s population share of 0.8.
Holding ψ equal to 0.9, ρ and ρ become 1.18 and 0.28, respectively. The inequality
measure ε stays at 0.45, since we continue to assume that the top quantile in the
population, the elites, get 40 percent of the total income. With these parameter
values, the probability of being in the common interest state in the second period
[1−H(ρ)] turns out to be 0.33. See Table 3.1 for the summary of all parameter
values used in the benchmarks.
Next, we let the political stability and the inequality measures vary. First,
consider the effect of political inequality on state capacity investment. In Proposition
3.5, we stated that when the elites are in power, in the presence of political instability
and income inequality, higher political inequality leads to lower investment in state
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Table 3.1: Parameter Values and Results
Parameter Description Value - Elites (Citizens)
βA Population share of group A 0.20 (0.80)
βB Population share of group B 0.80 (0.20)
Y = Y
A+Y B
2 Mean income 1.00
α1 Value of public goods in period 1 1.00
α Upper bound of α2 5.00
ψ Level of political inequality 0.90
ε Level of income inequality 0.45
γ Pol. stability constant for group A 0.19 (0.79)
ωA GDP Share for group A 0.40 (0.60)
ωB GDP Share for group B 0.60 (0.40)
ρ Political weight for group A 1.72 (1.18)
ρ Political weight for group B 0.82 (0.28)
ρβA Total weight for group A 0.34 (0.94)
ρβB Total weight for group B 0.66 (0.06)
[1−H(ρ)] Prob. of the common interest state 0.15 (0.33)
µα Mean of alpha 1.00
σα Std. of alpha 1.20
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capacity. This result is illustrated in Figure 3.1.a. As the political system becomes
less democratic, that is, as the value of ψ increases, the probability of being in
the redistribution state H(ρ) increases. In turn, the elites can definitely benefit
from collecting higher tax revenues in the second period by increasing the tax base.
But, given the presence of political instability, the citizens may take advantage
of the increased stock of state capacity and tax the elites at higher rates, if they
gain power in the second period. The elites become more concerned about the
second period outcome, due to the fear of being taxed at higher rates later as the
income gap between the two groups increases. Overall, from the elites’ point of
view, with higher income inequality and political instability, the current cost of
investing in state capacity is higher than the expected benefit from higher tax rates
in the second period. As a result, the level of state capacity stays low, even under
a more democratic system as reflected by the downward shift in the investment
curve with higher income inequality. Also, as income inequality increases the slope
of the investment curve becomes steeper. Therefore, when the elites are in power,
income inequality seems to amplify the negative effect of political inequality on the
investment decision.
As a second exercise, we drop the political instability assumption, and consider
the extreme case of full political stability, corresponding to γ = 1. As shown in
Figure 3.1.b, for lower levels of income inequality, the effect of political inequality
on the investment decision is positive. Given political stability, the elites choose to
invest in expanding the tax base, in order to be able to tax the citizens at higher
rates in the second period. However, as income inequality increases, the elites’
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Figure 3.1: Elites in Power - Political Inequality
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incentive to invest in state capacity is reduced, since the citizens hold only a very
small portion of the total income. Then, at very high levels of income inequality, it
is optimal for the elites to redistribute the collected tax revenues immediately.
Third, we hold the level of income inequality constant at ε = 0.45, and vary
the value of the political stability variable. As shown in Figure 3.1.c, as long as
there is political instability, higher political inequality leads to lower investment in
state capacity. This is mainly due to the elites’ fear of being taxed at higher rates in
the second period, if the citizens become the ruler. As the level of political stability
increases, the investment curve becomes less steep, showing that the positive effect of
political stability reduces the negative effect of political inequality on the investment
decision. Therefore, even when the elites are in power, a more democratic political
system, which is also stable, can lead to higher investment in state capacity.
Next, consider the effect of political inequality on the investment decision when
the citizens are in power. Figure 3.2.a shows that, when there is political instabil-
ity, at low levels of income inequality, political inequality has a negative effect on
investment in state capacity (Proposition 3.8). Note that, when there is no income
inequality, that is, when ε = 0, the two groups become identical, and the citizens
behave just like the elites do. However, when income inequality is high, the citizens
choose to invest more in state capacity as the political system becomes less equal.
As political inequality ψ increases, it is more likely that the world will be in the re-
distribution state in the second period, since H(ρ) also increases. Then, the citizens
would like to tax the elites at a higher rate to redistribute resources amongst them-
selves. As income inequality increases, the slope of the investment curve becomes
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steeper, due to the increasing rate at which they benefit from redistribution.
When there is full political stability, for all levels of income inequality, in-
vestment in state capacity increases as the citizens favor their group more, or as
political inequality increases. Figure 3.2.b displays that the investment curve be-
comes steeper as income inequality increases. Since the citizens hold only a small
portion of the total income at a high level of income inequality, they have a higher
incentive to tax the elites at higher rates in the second period. Hence, given that
there is full political stability, they invest more in expanding the tax base.
While this result is very intuitive, it does not reflect reality. In many countries,
even when the government is run by the political groups favoring the citizens, we
do not observe high levels of investment in state capacity. Figure 3.2.c suggests
an explanation for this observation. If we assume a reasonable level of income
inequality, say ε = 0.45, the citizens choose to make investment in state capacity only
when the political system is stable. At low levels of political stability, investment in
state capacity decreases with higher political inequality. That is, when the citizens
are less likely to be in power in the second period, they choose to redistribute the
tax revenues immediately, as many failed social revolutions have done in the past.
Lastly, consider the effect of income inequality on state capacity investment.
Proposition 3.6 states that when the elites are in power, investment in state capacity
decreases as income inequality increases. This result is robust to the changes in
the levels of political inequality and stability. However, Figures 3.3.a and 3.3.b
display that, when the citizens are the ruling group the effect of income inequality
on the investment decision depends on the level of political inequality (Proposition
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Figure 3.2: Citizens in Power - Political Inequality
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Figure 3.3: Citizens in Power - Income Inequality
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3.9). When the political system is more democratic, the government becomes more
utilitarian, and thus it keeps the tax rates lower by not increasing the stock of
state capacity. But, as the citizens favor their own group, higher income inequality
calls for more redistribution. The cost of investment does not change, but a higher
income gap between the groups makes investment more profitable from the citizens’
point of view, since the amount to be redistributed increases. Therefore, the citizens
increase the stock of state capacity in the first period, in order to be able tax the
elites at higher rates and transfer more resources to their own group members in
the second period. Note that, as the political system becomes less equal, first the
slope of the investment curve becomes less steep, then its sign changes. Under a
highly undemocratic political system, the value of ψ is high, which corresponds to a
higher probability of being in the redistribution state H(ρ). Since the redistribution
motive is high, investment in state capacity increases. Even when there is no political
instability, the same result follows, as seen in Figure 3.3.b.
In order to understand the effect of political stability on the relationship be-
tween income inequality and the investment decision, we fix the level of political
inequality ψ to 0.9. As shown in Figure 3.3.c, when the citizens favor their group,
higher income inequality leads to higher investment in state capacity. However, po-
litical stability plays an important role as well. The stock of state capacity is higher
when the political system is more stable.
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3.4 Empirical Analysis
So far, we have qualitatively determined the effects of fighting external wars
and political stability, as well as political and income inequality, on the decision of
the government to invest in state capacity. We summarize our theoretical results in
Table 3.2.
Table 3.2: Summary of Theoretical Results
The Qualitative Effect of Each Determinant on Investment in State Capacity
α2 (↑) α1 (↑) γ (↑) ψ (↑) ε (↑)
Benchmark - Elites Rule (↑) (↓) (↑) (↓) NA
Benchmark - Citizens Rule (↑) (↓) (↑) (↑) NA
With Income Inequality - Elites (↑) (↓) (↑) (↓) (↓)
With Income Inequality - Citizens (↑) (↓) (↑) (↓↑)* (↓↑)*
Note: * indicates that the sign depends on the interactions of the inequality measures.
We have found that, if the country is more likely be involved in an external
war, the government chooses to invest more in state capacity.6 Intuitively, the gov-
ernment would like to raise funds to be able to pay for military costs; therefore, it
increases the tax base by investing in state capacity. As for the inequality measures
and political instability, we showed that political instability and higher levels of po-
litical and/or income inequality lead to lower investment in state capacity, except
for the case where the citizens are in power, as we discussed in detail previously. If
the political system is less democratic and/or the distribution of income is unequal,
6We actually state a more general result: a higher expected demand for public goods leads to
higher investment in state capacity. Fighting an external war is an example of a situation where
the demand for public goods, such as defense, increases.
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the government’s priorities are shifted towards redistributing the tax revenues im-
mediately, since the benefit from redistribution in the first period outweighs the
expected benefit of collecting higher tax revenues in the second period.
In this section, we test the predictions of our model by applying econometric
methods on cross-sectional data.
3.4.1 Data
In our theoretical framework, we defined state capacity as the government’s
ability to raise tax revenues, following the earliest definition of state capacity as in
Tilly (1990). Accordingly, we use three different tax measures to proxy for state
capacity in the empirical analysis. Additionally, we relate state capacity to state’s
bureaucratic quality in line with Hendrix (2009), and use two more proxies.7 Here
is a brief description of the five measures of state capacity that we consider:
1. Total tax revenues: Annual average of total tax revenues, reported as
percentage share in GDP, for the periods 1980-2006 and 2000-2006. We use the
data from Baunsgaard and Keen (2009), which is constructed using Government
Finance Statistics (GFS) and IMF country documents.8 The initial sample contains
125 countries. We also include Mexico and Brazil in our sample and take the tax
data for these countries from the dataset used in Lora (2007).
2. Income tax revenues: Annual average of income tax revenues, reported
as percentage share in the GDP, for the period 1980-2000. We use the dataset
7See Appendix B.2 for the details of Hendrix (2009).
8The dataset was generously provided by Thomas Baunsgaard and Michael Keen.
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from Baunsgaard and Keen (2005), which is a previous version of the one used in
Baunsgaard and Keen (2009). We also add the data for Mexico and Brazil from
Lora (2007).
3. Domestic tax revenues: Annual average of the GDP share of total tax
revenues net of trade tax revenues, for the period 1980-2006. The resources are the
same as those used to construct the dataset for total tax revenues.
4. Government effectiveness index: An index which represents one of the
six dimensions of governance, computed for the Worldwide Governance Indicators
(WGI) research project and reported in Kaufmann et al. (2009).9 This particular
index measures the quality of public services, the capacity of the civil service and its
independence from political pressures, as well as the quality of policy formulation.
The index values are computed for every year since 1996, and range between -2.5
and 2.5, where a higher value indicates a more effective government. We use the
averages of all the values available for each country, for the periods 1996-2008 and
2002-2008.10
5. Ease of doing business ranking: A ranking of the countries according to the
Ease of Doing Business category of the Doing Business Project of the World Bank.11
9See Appendix B.2 for further details.
10See http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/.
11The data can be found at http://www.doingbusiness.org/. For each economy, the index is
calculated as the ranking on the simple average of its percentile rankings on each of the following
10 topics: Starting a business, dealing with construction permits, employing workers, register-
ing property, getting credit, protecting investors, paying taxes, trading across borders, enforcing
contracts and closing a business.
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We use the 2009 version of the dataset, which covers 181 countries. We modify the
rankings, so that each country takes a value between 0 and 1, where the country
that is ranked as the best in terms of ease of doing business has a value of 1.
As for the possible determinants of state capacity, we use the following data:
1. Incidence of external wars: We construct a dummy variable that takes
a value of 1 if the country has been involved in an external war in a given year,
and 0 otherwise. We use the definitions and the data from the Correlates of War
database.12 We define the incidence as the fraction of the years that the country
has been involved in an external war for two time periods: 1900-1975 (or since
independence if this occurred after 1900) and 1960-1997. Thus, our variable goes
12The original data can be reached online at http://correlatesofwar.org/. In the data, there are
two variables that refer to external conflict: interstatewar and extrastatewar. To be classified as
an interstate war, at least two participants in sustained combat must qualify as members of the
interstate system and there must be at least 1,000 battle related fatalities among all of the system
members involved. A state involved is regarded as a participant if it incurs a minimum of 100
fatalities or has 1,000 armed personnel engaged in fighting. Extrastate wars are wars between a
state and a non-state entity. To be classified as an extrastate war, at least one major participant
in the conflict (however irregular and disorganized) must not be a member of the state system and
there must be at least 1,000 battle related fatalities in every year for each of the state participants.
The year for which either or both of the two indicators are equal to unity is counted as a year in
which the country has been involved in an external war. Also, see the discussion of democracy
variables for the matching procedure with modern countries. The Correlates of War data report
countries that have involved in civil wars or internal disputes in other polities (e.g., European
powers that were involved during the Russian civil war after the end of World War I). The data
reported here exclude foreign countries from the definition of civil wars.
93
from 0 to 1, where a country that has been engaged in an external war in all years
in the sample has a value of 1. This measure proxies for α used in the theoretical
model.
2. Political Instability/Stability: We use two different measures. The first one
is the incidence of civil wars, which proxies for political instability (corresponding to
(1− γ)), since the risk of civil war increases with political instability (Hegre et al.
(2001), Fearon and Laitin (2003), and Blattman and Miguel (2010)) and the gov-
ernment is likely to be overthrown as a result of a civil war. We construct a dummy
variable that takes a value of 1 if the country has been involved in an internal war
that took place in its own territory in a given year, and 0 otherwise.13 Again, our
dataset comes from the Correlates of War. The incidence is then defined as the frac-
tion of the years from 1900 to 1975, or from 1960 to 1997, that the country has been
engaged in an internal war, reported only for the time period that the country has
been independent since 1900. The result is a variable that ranges from 0 to 1, where
1 represents that a country that has been in an internal war in all years in the sam-
ple. Our second proxy is the Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism
13In order to be classified as a civil war, the central government must be actively involved in
military action with effective resistance for both sides and there must be at least 1,000 battle related
deaths. In order to constitute effective resistance, both sides must have been initially organized
for violent conflict, or the weaker side must be able to inflict upon the stronger opponents at least
five percent of the number of fatalities it sustains. We add the additional territory restriction,
because in many cases countries got involved in civil wars or internal disputes that took place in
other polities (e.g., some European powers were involved during the Russian civil war after the
end of World War I).
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index computed for the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) research project
and reported in Kaufmann et al. (2009).14 It is constructed to ‘capture perceptions
of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by uncon-
stitutional or violent means, including politically-motivated violence and terrorism.’
Higher index values indicate more stable political environments (higher γ). We use
the data for 1998.15
3. Incidence of Democracy (Political equality): We assume that the political
system is more equal if it is more democratic (lower ψ). We proxy for political
equality with each country’s Polity2 score in the Polity IV database.16 The Polity2
score captures the regime authority on a spectrum of a 21-point scale ranging from
-10 (hereditary monarchy) to 10 (consolidated democracy). The score is constructed
by calculating the difference between the regime’s democracy and autocracy scores
for a given year. Since we are interested in capturing the regimes that are likely to
represent low levels of political inequality, we define a country to be democratic in
a certain year, if the Polity2 score is greater than 3.17 As in the case of the conflict
variables, we compute the fraction of the years that a country has a Polity2 score
greater than 3 for the period between 1900 and 1975 (or since independence if this
occurred after 1900) and the period between 1960 and 1999.18
14See Appendix B.2 for the details on the construction of this variable.
15The averages for 1996 and 1998 are also used as a robustness check.
16The data can be accessed online at http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm.
17We also use a second definition that considers a country to be democratic in a certain year if
the Polity2 score is greater than 0.
18Here we note how we match the country classifications used in the Polity IV and Correlates
of War databases to current classifications. We first take all the countries that currently exist
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4. Gini coefficient (Income inequality): We use gini coefficient for the total
population of the country, as a proxy for ε in our model. We use the data from
the 2008 World Income Inequality Database of the United Nations University -
World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER). The data
cover the time period 1867-2006, and include, in the more recent years, 186 countries.
The reported gini coefficients come from surveys which can differ greatly, in ten
dimensions, such as area (e.g., national, rural, urban, metropolitan areas, cities,
etc.), population group (e.g., all, workers, taxpayers, certain age groups, etc.), unit of
analysis (e.g., individual, household, etc.) and measure of economic conditions (e.g.,
income or expenditures). Given the heterogeneity in the original data, we use the
gini measures derived from national surveys covering all the population. If more than
one observation per country/year meets these criteria, then we choose the higher
quality observation (based on a quality index included in the database). Finally,
if there are still several reported gini coefficients for the same country and year,
and match them to their equivalent country in the above mentioned datasets. We then match
some of the current countries to their previous political entities, if the current country is clearly a
continuation of the previous one. For example, Germany is matched to West Germany and to the
original German state classified in Polity IV and Correlates of War (the same is done with Ethiopia
and Vietnam-North Vietnam). Finally, if the current countries were part of a larger independent
political entity before 1975, we assign the polity2 and war indicators of the older country to the
new ones. For example Czech and Slovak Republic are both assigned the value of Czechoslovakia.
The same procedure is applied to Bangladesh and Pakistan, and the countries that originated
from the USSR and Yugoslavia. The Baltic countries and Serbia, which did exist before they were
absorbed by the USSR and Yugoslavia, are not matched to their historical equivalents.
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we choose those with a common characteristic (among the remaining 7 dimensions)
with more observations in the original database. Our resulting data have information
for 88 countries for the period 1890-1975, and consist of 338 observations in total.
From this dataset, we construct and use the average gini coefficient for the periods
1900-1975 and 1960-1999.19
The descriptive statistics for the measures and the determinants of state ca-
pacity are presented in Tables B.1 and B.2 in Appendix B.2.
3.4.2 Empirical Results
We first graphically present the cross-correlations between the measures and
the determinants of state capacity. The following three measures are used as proxies
for state capacity in this exercise: the GDP share of total tax revenues (2000-
2006), the government effectiveness index (2002-2008) and the ease of doing business
ranking (2009). The cross-correlations are plotted in Figures 3.4 and 3.5.
The democracy scores and the incidence of external wars are positively corre-
lated with each measure of state capacity we consider. On the contrary, the incidence
of internal wars and the gini coefficients are negatively correlated with the measures
of state capacity. The data show that, countries with more democratic political sys-
tems (less political inequality) and higher valuation of public goods (higher incidence
of external wars) have higher levels of state capacity. However, higher incidence of
19For 31 countries there is only one data point. The country with the maximum number of
observations between 1900 and 1975 is the United States. The median country has 2 observations
in that period.
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Figure 3.4: Cross Correlations - Measures vs. Determinants of State Capacity
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Figure 3.5: Cross Correlations (Cont.) - Measures vs. Determinants of State Ca-
pacity
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internal wars (higher political instability) and higher levels of income inequality are
related to lower levels of state capacity. This empirical evidence is line with our
earlier theoretical predictions.
Next, we move on to more formal econometric analysis. Our primary empirical
tests are based on the ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of the following form:
SCi = β0 + βewExtWari + βiwIntWari + βpolPolityi + βginiGinii + εi (3.23)
where SCi is a measure of state capacity for country i. ExtWari and IntWari
stand for the incidence of external and internal wars, respectively. As discussed ear-
lier, we use the incidence of internal wars as a proxy for political instability. To
check for the robustness of our results, in a second set of regressions, we replace
IntWari with PolStabi, which stands for the political stability and absence of vi-
olance/terrorism index. Polityi measures the incidence of democracy, which proxies
for the level of political equality. Ginii is the gini coefficient, which measures the
level of income inequality. Finally, ε is an error term capturing all other omitted
factors, with E(ε) = 0 for all i.
We are aware that there may be potential endogeneity and simultaneity prob-
lems. Our explanatory variables may have been jointly determined with the different
measures of state capacity, through channels that our model fails to capture. We
deal with these potential problems by measuring all explanatory variables before the
years when the proxies for state capacity are observed and measured. For a better
treatment of the endogeneity issues, see the panel data study in Cárdenas, Ramı́rez
and Tüzemen (2011).
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We use the data from two different sample periods in the estimations. The first
sample considers a long-run perspective, and the average values of the explanatory
variables correspond to the period 1900-1975. The purpose of the regressions using
the long term sample is to see to what extent the historical levels of democracy,
inequality and wars have had an impact on the average values of state capacity,
which are measured after 1980. The second sample is constructed with more recent
measures: the average values of the explanatory variables are calculated for the
periods 1960-1997 and 1960-1999, while state capacity is measured after 2000.
Table 3.3 reports the results for the first set of regressions, where the long term
data are used. The estimates in Panel a indicate that countries with more democratic
political systems have, on average, higher levels of state capacity, compared to the
countries with less democratic political systems. Quantitatively, a one standard
deviation increase in our measure of democracy is associated with a 4.1 percentage
point increase in the GDP share of total taxes, and a 3.5 percentage point increase in
the GDP share of income taxes. A country with a one standard deviation decrease
in the level of political inequality has a 0.4 increase (in a scale that ranges between -
2.5 and +2.5) in the government effectiveness index, while the ease of doing business
ranking increases by 0.1 (in a scale ranging from 0 to 1).
As for the incidence of external wars, we find that countries that have spent
more years fighting external wars have higher state capacity. More precisely, a
country with one standard deviation higher incidence of external wars has a 2.6
percentage points higher GDP share of total taxes, a 2 percentage points higher GDP
share of income taxes, and a 5.2 percentage points higher share of domestic taxes
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in total taxes. When we use the non-fiscal proxies of state capacity, a one standard
deviation increase in the incidence of external wars turns out to be associated with
a 0.2 increase in the government effectiveness index, and a 0.1 increase in the ease
of doing business ranking.
The estimates in Table 3.3.a further indicate that countries engaged in internal
wars have, on average, lower state capacity. Since the incidence of internal wars is
used as the proxy for political instability, we conclude that higher political instability
is related to lower state capacity. Quantitatively, a one standard deviation increase
in the incidence of internal wars corresponds to a 1.7 percentage point decrease
in the GDP share of total taxes.20 A country with one standard deviation higher
incidence of internal wars reduces the government effectiveness index and the ease
of doing business ranking by 0.2 and 0.1, respectively.
These results generally hold when we also control for income inequality. How-
ever, as reported in Table 3.3.b, when state capacity is proxied with the GDP share
of total taxes, the statistically significant relationship between the incidence of in-
ternal wars and state capacity is no longer observed.21 Nevertheless, we find that
countries with more equal distribution of income are associated with higher levels
20The statistically significant relationship between the incidence of internal wars and state ca-
pacity is no longer observed when we use the other two fiscal proxies.
21The problem that we face when we include the gini coefficient as an additional regressor is the
loss of some of our observations. We use between 104 and 154 observations for the set of regressions
for the benchmark model. The number of observations we can use decreases to a number between
67 and 80, when we add the gini as an additional explanatory variable. This reduction in the
sample size may be responsible for the insignificance of some of our results.
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Table 3.3: Determinants of State Capacity: Long-Run Perspective
a. Without Income Inequality
Tot. Taxes Inc. Taxes Dom. Taxes Government Ease of Doing
(% of GDP) (% of GDP) (% of Tot.Taxes) Effectiveness Business
1980-2006 1980-2000 1980-2006 1996-2008 2009
Democracy 10.670*** 9.160*** 5.817 1.045*** 0.233***
1900-1975 (2.888) (2.561) (4.939) (0.228) (0.068)
Ext. Wars 23.480*** 18.410** 46.870*** 1.914*** 0.580***
1900-1975 (8.638) (7.593) (11.470) (0.520) (0.150)
Int. Wars -13.020* -3.735 12.130 -1.516*** -0.501***
1900-1975 (7.498) (4.357) (11.390) (0.440) (0.144)
Constant 14.030*** 3.829*** 73.370*** -0.538*** 0.306***
(0.932) (0.606) (1.936) (0.086) (0.032)
No. of Obs. 104 104 104 154 147
Adj. R-sq. 0.520 0.562 0.234 0.473 0.427
b. With Income Inequality
Tot. Taxes Inc. Taxes Dom. Taxes Government Ease of Doing
(% of GDP) (% of GDP) (% of Tot.Taxes) Effectiveness Business
1980-2006 1980-2000 1980-2006 1996-2008 2009
Democracy 7.864** 6.879** 7.327 1.145*** 0.288***
1900-1975 (2.985) (2.631) (5.910) (0.233) (0.088)
Ext. Wars 28.970*** 22.320*** 40.380*** 1.866*** 0.542***
1900-1975 (9.038) (7.626) (14.080) (0.551) (0.182)
Int. Wars -14.270 -4.171 0.017 -2.244*** -0.583***
1900-1975 (9.712) (5.160) (11.020) (0.413) (0.192)
Ln of Gini 2.345 -0.876 3.408 -0.833** -0.054
1900-1975 (5.675) (4.059) (10.480) (0.381) (0.115)
Constant 6.585 7.668 63.280 2.771* 0.532
(21.830) (15.540) (40.140) (1.518) (0.450)
No. of Obs. 67 67 67 80 78
Adj. R-sq. 0.549 0.561 0.210 0.595 0.485
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses: * p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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of state capacity when we use the government effectiveness index as the measure of
state capacity.
Table 3.4 reports the regression results for the more recent measures. While
the data for the measures of state capacity are for the 2000s, the data for democracy
and inequality are for the period 1960-1999, and the data for external wars are for the
period 1960-1997. The GDP share of total taxes, the government effectiveness index
and the ease of doing business ranking are used as the proxies for state capacity.
We replace the incidence of internal wars with the political stability and absence of
violance/terrorism index (1998). So, our focus changes from the effect of political
instability to the effect of political stability on state capacity. The basic results,
presented in columns 1, 5 and 9 of Table 3.4, show that democracy is positively
correlated with the recent measures of state capacity. Similarly, the coefficient
estimate of the political stability index is highly significant and positive, confirming
that political stability is an important element of stronger states.22
While these results support the conclusions drawn from the previous regres-
sions, there are some differences as well. First, the positive correlation between the
incidence of external wars and state capacity vanishes in the case of the GDP share
of total taxes (shown in column 1), suggesting that external conflict no longer plays
the role (for taxation) it had played in the earlier part of the 20th century. Second,
the results in columns 2, 6 and 10 of Table 3.4 show that income inequality is highly
22We repeat the analysis by using the averages for the political stability variable for 1996 and
1998. Our results are robust to this change. The corresponding estimation results are available
upon request.
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negatively correlated with state capacity in the recent time period (except for the
case of the GDP share of total taxes).
We also introduce two new terms corresponding to the interaction of income
inequality with political equality (ln of the gini coefficient and the incidence of
democracy), and the interaction of income inequality with political stability (ln of
the gini coefficient and the political stability index). The coefficient estimates of the
two interacted terms are both negative and significant, when the GDP share of total
taxes and the government effectiveness index are used to proxy for state capacity
(shown in columns 3, 4, 7 and 8 of Table 3.4). In the case of the first interacted
term, the estimation results indicate that income inequality reduces the magnitude
of the positive correlation between democracy and state capacity, which is line with
the prediction of our theory (Proposition 3.7). Similarly, the negative significance
of the second interacted term shows that, in the presence of income inequality, the
positive correlation between political stability and state capacity is dampened.
In the last set of regressions, we use the recent measures, but proxy political
instability with the incidence of internal wars as in the long term regressions. The
results are reported in Table 3.5. In line with our previous results, we find that
countries with higher democracy scores and higher incidence of external wars (except





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Moreover, income inequality has a significant negative correlation with all of
the measures of state capacity as shown in columns 2, 6 and 10 of Table 3.5. In the
case of wars, our results indicate that internal wars have a significant and negative
correlation with all of the measures of state capacity in the recent time period.
Therefore, internal wars, rather than external, are more important in explaining the
differences in state capacity across countries when state capacity is proxied with the
GDP share of total taxes.23
We continue to include the interacted terms, which capture the interaction
of income inequality with democracy and the incidence of internal wars (used as
a proxy for political instability, rather than political stability). As in the previous
regressions, the results in columns 3, 7 and 11 of Table 3.5 show that income in-
equality leads to a reduction in the positive correlation between democracy and state
capacity (except for the case of ease of doing business ranking). On the contrary,
the coefficient estimate of second interacted term is significant and positive in all
regressions (in columns 4, 8 and 12 of Table 3.5), since both income inequality and
political instability are negatively correlated with state capacity. In other words,
in the presence of income inequality, the negative correlation of internal wars with
state capacity, and the positive correlation of political stability with state capacity
are reduced.24
23These results support the panel estimations results in Cárdenas and Eslava (2010). They find
that the incidence of internal wars, rather than the incidence of external wars, is the key driver
for the changes in state capacity.
24The results reported in Tables 3-5 are robust to using the alternative definition of democracy,
which considers a country to be democratic in a certain year, if the Polity2 score is greater than
108
3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we studied the economic and political factors that shape the
government’s decision to invest in state capacity. Our model showed that political
stability and equality are the building blocks of stronger states. While political
stability calls for higher investment in state capacity, political and income inequality
lead to lower investment. In line with the existing literature, we found that wars,
whether external or internal, are important determinants as well. While external
wars result in higher state capacity, civil wars lead to weaker states.
Our empirical analysis confirmed that countries with more democratic political
systems and lower income inequality are associated with higher state capacity. We
found that more stable governments (whether measured with the lower incidence of
internal wars or a higher political stability index) have higher state capacity. Our
results further indicate that the magnitudes of the positive correlations of democ-
racy and political stability with state capacity are significantly reduced with higher
income inequality. To conclude, high political and/or income inequality, absence of
external wars and high political instability (or the presence of common and long-
lasting civil wars) stand out as the main reasons why some governments under-invest
in state capacity.
While we have taken important steps to contribute to the recently growing lit-
erature on various dimensions of state capacity, we believe that there are many the-
oretical and empirical issues which deserve further attention. For example, by using
0. The corresponding estimation results are available upon request.
109
a two-period model, we abstracted from the possible differences in the short-run and
the long-run investment decisions of the government. We assumed that the level of
political inequality is exogenously determined. This assumption can be relaxed and
the model can be improved by considering a dynamic multi-period version, where
investment in state capacity, provision of public goods and the representativeness
of the political system are simultaneously determined by the government. While
we assumed the investment and public goods provision decisions to be dependent
on political stability, the causality can go in the opposite direction as well. Finally,
civil wars can be re-defined as the rebellious movements by the citizens, which occur
when they find the government policies to be unsatisfactory, in terms of redistribu-
tion, the level of the provision of public goods and political representation. Such an
approach may bring more insight to the trade-offs faced by the government, as well
as the consequences of different political and fiscal policies.
Empirically, it would be worthwhile to re-investigate the effects of the inter-
actions between political and income inequality on state capacity, when different
income/political groups run the government. On this issue, our theory predicts dif-
ferent results depending on the group in power (elites and citizens). In the data,
grouping governments according to their political stance, such as the right wing and
the left wing, may be one way to represent such a distinction. It then becomes
an empirical challenge to analyze the effects of the interactions of the inequality
measures on the government’s decision to invest in state capacity.
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Appendix A
A.1 Solution to the Household’s Optimization Problem


















t , kt) = max
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t) + rtkt + πt = ct + it + Tt (A.2)
it = kt+1 − (1− δ)kt (A.3)











nbt+1 = (1− ψ)
[
(1− pgt st)nbt + pbtubt
]
(A.5)
lt = 1− ugt − ubt − n
g
t − [1 + κ(st)]nbt (A.6)
The FOCs are:
FOC wrt ct : uc(ct) = λt (A.7)






































































































t , kt) = −hl(lt) + λtw
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t+1, kt+1), and then substitute them back into


































































These are the two participation conditions shown in the text.





one gets the Euler equation for consumption:
uc(ct) = βEt{uc(ct+1)(rt+1 + 1− δ)} (A.26)









































A.2 Solutions to the Firms’ Optimization Problems
The optimization problem of a high-wage firm is to choose vgt and K
g
t , taking
{wgt , qgt , P rgt , rt, zt} as given, to maximize the value function:
V fgt (N
g










subject to the law of motion for employment in the market for high-wage jobs:







where Ξt+1|t is the stochastic discount factor. Note that the value of Ξt+1|t is derived





The FOCs with respect to Kgt and v
g
t are:

























Taking the derivative of the Bellman equation with respect to N gt gives:
V fgNg(N
g














which is equivalent to:
V fgNg(N
g








































which is the job creation condition for high-wage firms.
Similarly, the optimization problem of a low-wage firm is to choose vbt and K
b
t ,
taking {wbt , qbt , p
g
t , st, P r
b
t , rt, zt} as given, to maximize the value function:
V fbt (N
b












subject to the law of motion for employment in the market for low-wage jobs:
N bt+1 = (1− ψ)
[
(1− pgt st)N bt + qbtvbt
]
(A.39)
The FOCs with respect to Kbt and v
b
t are:

























Taking the derivative of the Bellman equation with respect to N bt gives:
V fbNb(N
b
















which is equivalent to:
V fbNb(N
b














































which is the job creation condition for low-wage firms.
A.3 Determination of the Wage Rates










































t , zt) gives:
(1− µ)wgt − (1− µ)
hl(lt)
λt
























































where λt is replaced with uc(ct). This is the wage rate the worker receives when
working for a high-wage job.
Similarly, the following Nash Bargaining Problem is solved to find the wage








































t , zt) gives:





























































Substituting this into the above equation gives:
(1− µ)wbt − (1− µ)
[1 + κ(st)]hl(lt)
λt






































(1− µ)wbt − (1− µ)
[1 + κ(st)]hl(lt)
λt




























One more substitution gives:




























which is the wage rate the worker receives when working for a low-wage job.
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Appendix B
B.1 Proofs of Propositions in Chapter 3
Proof of Proposition 3.4. Using the definition of political inequality, ψ = ρ− ρ
and the constraint, ρβA + ρβB = 1,
re-write the weighting parameters as ρ = 1 + ψβB, and ρ = 1− ψβA.

































which is negative when γ ≤ βA. QED.
Proof of Proposition 3.5. Having defined the the per capita income levels with

































βBh(ρ)ψ(1− γ) +H(ρ)(βA − γ)
] [






which is negative when γ ≤ βA is assumed. QED.
Proof of Proposition 3.6. Taking the derivative of the OPT equality in Equa-

















γβB + (1− γ)βA
] }
(B.5)
which is negative. QED.
Proof of Proposition 3.7. Taking the derivative of the OPT equality in Equa-







which is negative, since βB > βA when the elites are the ruling group and we assume
F ′′′(4τ) = 0. Previously, it was derived as ∂(4τ)
∂(γ)
> 0 and concluded that the effect
of political stability on state capacity investment decision is positive. The negative
sign associated with the above second derivative shows that, as income inequal-
ity increases, the positive impact of political stability on the investment decision
decreases. QED.









which is negative, since βA > βB when the citizens are the ruling group and we
continue to assume F ′′′(4τ) = 0.
Proof of Proposition 3.8. Using the new assumptions (for the case of the cit-

































βBh(ρ)ψ(1− γ) +H(ρ)(βA − γ)
] [





Note that it is not possible to tell the sign of the derivative analytically. When
γ ≤ βA, for low levels of income inequality, higher political inequality leads to lower
investment in state capacity. However, when the level of income inequality is high,
the sign of the derivative is likely to become positive. The effect of income inequality






βBh(ρ)ψ(1− γ) +H(ρ)(βA − γ)
]




which is positive, assuming F ′′′(4τ) = 0. Therefore, when the effect of political
inequality is to lower the level of investment in state capacity, then higher income
inequality reduces this effect. On the contrary, if the impact of political inequality
is positive on the investment decision, then higher income inequality amplifies this
effect. QED.
Proof of Proposition 3.9. Taking the derivative of the OPT equality with re-


















γβB + (1− γ)βA
] }
(B.11)
Again, it is not possible to determine the sign of the derivative analytically.
However, for low levels of political inequality, the first term is likely to cancel off the
positive effect of the last terms. Therefore, it can be concluded that for low levels
of political inequality, higher income inequality leads to lower investment in state
capacity. However, when the level of political inequality is high, the effect of income
inequality on the investment decision is likely to have the opposite sign. The effect






βBh(ρ)ψ(1− γ) +H(ρ)(βA − γ)
]
(βA − βB) + 2βAβBε
λ(α1)F ′′(4τ)
(B.12)
which is positive, assuming F ′′′(4τ) = 0. Therefore, when the effect of income in-
equality on the level of investment in state capacity is in the negative direction,
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higher political inequality reduces this effect. On the contrary, if the impact of
income inequality is positive on the investment decision, then higher political in-
equality amplifies this effect. QED.
B.2 Additional Details on the Data
B.2.1 Measures of State Capacity
The term ‘state capacity’ has been widely used in the political science, sociol-
ogy, and more recently in the economics literature. The interpretation varies. Ac-
cording to Hendrix (2009), the use of the term can be grouped into three categories.
The first one is military capacity, which represents the states ability to overcome
the rebellious actions against its authority with force. The proxies commonly used
in this category are military personnel per capita and military spending per capita.
The second one is bureaucratic and administrative capacity, which focuses on the
professionalization of the state bureaucracy, its ability to protect property rights,
and make credible commitments to private investors, as well as its ability to raise
revenue from the society. The popular measures used in this category consist of Po-
litical Risk Services Groups International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), specifically
the measure that assesses the risk of expropriation and repudiation of government
contracts. This category also includes measures of fiscal state capacity, such as the
GDP share of total taxes, the share of income taxes in total taxes and the share
of domestic (non-trade) taxes in total taxes. The third category is the quality and
coherence of political institutions, which considers the degree of interference be-
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tween the democratic and nondemocratic features in the political system. Studies
in the civil war literature, such as Hegre et al. (2001), Fearon and Laitin (2003) and
DeRouen and Sobek (2004) use the Polity index to represent this concept of state
capacity.
All the above mentioned measures of state capacity are highly collinear and
endogenous, so it is appropriate to select a few that are highly correlated with the
others. Using factor analysis, Hendrix (2009) shows that bureaucratic quality and
the GDP share of total taxes stand out as the most representative definitions and
measures of state capacity. In total, Hendrix uses 15 different and highly corre-
lated measures of state capacity including military personnel and expenditures (per
capita), ICRGs measures of bureaucratic quality and investment profile, GDP share
of total taxes, GDP share of total revenue and Polity2 index, among others. Us-
ing principal factor analysis to create a smaller set of measures that can account
for most of the variance in the 15 measures, he finds that, bureaucratic quality
and GDP share of total tax revenues can explain cumulatively 90.6 percent of the
variance in all the measures considered, with the first factor alone capturing 53.2
percent. In what follows, the focus here is on the bureaucratic and administrative
definitions of state capacity in our empirical analysis. Five different measures are
used to proxy for state capacity. The first three measures (GDP share of total taxes,
GDP share of income taxes, total tax share of domestic taxes) are related to the
state’s ability to raise revenue from the public, while the remaining two measures
(government effectiveness index and ease of doing business ranking) represent the
state’s bureaucratic quality.
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B.2.2 Construction of the Political Stability and Absence of Violence
Index
Kaufmann et al. (2009) organize many individual sources of the data on
governance perceptions and assign them to these six broad categories: 1. Voice
and Accountability, 2. Political Stability and Absence of Violence, 3. Government
Effectiveness, 4. Regulatory Quality, 5. Rule of Law, 6. Control of Corruption.
Then, they use an unobserved components model to construct aggregate indicators
from these individual measures.
The following data sources are used in the construction of the political stability
and absence of violence index:
A. Representative Sources: 1. BRI (Business Environment Risk Intelligence
Business Risk Service / Financial Ethics Index): a. Fractionalization of political
spectrum and the power of these factions, b. Fractionalization by language, ethnic
and/or religious groups and the power of these factions, c. Restrictive (coercive)
measures required to retain power, d. Organization and strength of forces for a
radical government, e. Societal conflict involving demonstrations, strikes and street
violence, f. Instability as perceived by non-constitutional changes, assassinations
and guerrilla wars; 2. DRI (Global Insight Global Risk Service): a. Military coup
risk, b. Major insurgency/rebellion, c. Political terrorism, d. Political assassination,
e. Civil war, f. Major urban riot; 3. EIU (Economist Intelligence Unit Riskwire and
Democracy Index): a. Armed conflict, b. Violent demonstrations, c. Social unrest,
d. International tensions; 4. GAD (Cerberus Intelligence Gray Area Dynamics):
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a. Autonomy and separatism, b. Civil unrest, c. State of emergency/martial law,
d. Active terrorist groups in the last two years; 5. GCS (World Economic Fo-
rum Global Competitiveness Report): Country terrorist threat : Does the threat
of terrorism in the country impose significant costs on firms? 6. HUM (Cingranelli
Richards Human Rights Database and Political Terror Scale): a. Frequency of po-
litical killings, b. Frequency of disappearances, c. Frequency of torture; 7. IJT
(iJET Country Security Risk Ratings): Security risk rating; 8. IPD (Institutional
Profiles Database): a. Conflicts of ethnic, religious, regional nature, b. Violent ac-
tions by underground political organizations, c. Violent social conflicts, d. External
public security; 9. PRS (Political Risk Services International Country Risk Guide):
a. Internal Conflict: Assesses political violence and its influence on governance, b.
External conflict: The external conflict measure is an assessment both of the risk
to the incumbent government and to inward investment, c. Government stability:
Measures the governments ability to carry out its declared programs and its ability
to stay in office, d. Ethnic tensions: This component measures the degree of tension
within a country attributable to racial, nationality or language divisions; 10. PTS
(Political terror scale); 11. WMO (Global Insight Business Conditions and Risk In-
dicators): a. Civil unrest: How widespread political unrest is and how great a threat
it poses to investors, b. Terrorism: Whether the country suffers from a sustained
terrorist threat and from how many sources.
B. Non-representative Sources: 1. AEO (OECD Development Center African
Economic Outlook): Civil tensions, b. WCY (Institute for Management and Devel-
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